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INTRODUCTION 
American intestacy law frequently forces children to honor fi-
nancially their father and mother, but little evidence suggests they 
want to, at least after their own deaths.  Although the parent-child re-
lationship is one of the most innate and primordial of all human 
bonds, this bond does not seem to manifest itself in a child’s sense of 
financial obligation to his parents after his death. 
Much has been written on the role of parents’ obligations and 
intentions toward their children.  Parents owe a duty of support to 
their children in all states, and children are the primary recipients of 
parental affection, even sometimes before the surviving spouse.  As a 
result, children are frequently the primary beneficiaries of their par-
ents’ estates after death.  Surprisingly little scholarship, however, ex-
ists on the reverse phenomenon of children’s obligations or inten-
tions toward parents in a like context.  Although not all states impose 
an obligation on children to support parents in necessitous circum-
stances, a natural affinity undoubtedly exists between children and 
parents given the nearness of the blood relationship and a child’s de-
sire to reciprocate for the love and support given to him by his par-
ents over the course of his lifetime. 
This Paper examines the unexplored issue of parental inheri-
tance from children in the context of intestacy.  Part I of this Paper 
delineates the general theories that motivate the basic rules of intes-
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tate inheritance.  After doing so, Part II explores those purposes in 
the context of a child dying and being survived by (a) parents and a 
surviving spouse; (b) parents and siblings; and (c) so-called “bad” 
parents.  Within each of these three situations, this Paper reviews the 
current approaches in the United States and posits which approach is 
the dominant trend in the area and why.  Finally, Part III assesses the 
evidence with regard to the purposes of intestacy, finds American law 
largely defective, and concludes with suggestions for reform. 
I. THEORIES AND PURPOSES OF INTESTACY LAW 
Most people die without a will and are therefore subject to the 
laws of intestacy. 1  Regardless of their broad application, intestacy 
laws are important because they embody the collective judgment of a 
society as to how an individual’s property should devolve in the ab-
sence of an expression by the decedent.  This societal judgment is a 
product of, among other things, societal mores, cultural influences, 
and the availability of economic resources.2  Despite the importance 
 1 JOEL C. DOBRIS, STEWART E. STERK & MELANIE B. LESLIE, ESTATES AND TRUSTS: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 62 (2d ed. 2003) (“Most Americans die without wills.”); Allison 
Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at Death, 30 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 241, 248 (1963); Mary Louise Fellows, Rita J. Simon & William Rau, Public At-
titudes About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United 
States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 324, 337 (1978) (finding only about forty-five per-
cent of the sample population had wills); Mary Louise Fellows, Rita J. Simon, Teal E. 
Snapp & William D. Snapp, Empirical Study of the Illinois Statutory Estate Plan, 1976 U. 
ILL. L.F. 717, 718 n.3 (1976); Monica K. Johnson & Jennifer Robbennolt, Using Social 
Science to Inform the Law of Intestacy: The Case of Unmarried Committed Partners, 22 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 479 (1998) (finding only forty percent of respondents with opposite-sex 
partners had wills, but finding a majority of those with same-sex partners had wills); 
Edward H. Ward & J.H. Beuscher, The Inheritance Process in Wisconsin, 1950 WIS. L. 
REV. 393, 396 (1950).  But see MARVIN B. SUSSMAN, JUDITH N. CATES & DAVID T. SMITH, 
THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE 64 (1970) (finding approximately fifty-eight percent of 
the sample population had wills); LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, 
MARY LOUISE FELLOWS & THOMAS P. GALLANIS, FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 35 (2002) (suggesting that the 
conventional wisdom may be incorrect and that perhaps “it’s more accurate to sug-
gest that most people who die prematurely die intestate”); John R. Price, The Trans-
mission of Wealth at Death in a Community Property Jurisdiction, 50 WASH. L. REV. 277, 295 
(1975) (finding fifty-nine percent of the respondents in the Washington study were 
testate). 
 2 See generally SUSSMAN, CATES & SMITH, supra note 1, at 121 (“The decedent’s 
conception of justice is embodied in his last will and testament . . . .  Society’s con-
ception of justice may be considered to be shown by the . . . Statute of Descent and 
Distribution.”); Jack Goody, Strategies of Heirship, 15 COMP. STUD. IN SOC. & HIST. 3, 3–
20 (1973) (concluding that “different uses made of strategies of heirship in Africa 
and Eurasia seem to be related” to the availability or scarcity of land, as distinct from 
labor, as a resource).  See also Jack Goody, Sideways or Downwards? Lateral and Vertical 
Succession, Inheritance and Descent in Africa and Eurasia, 5 MAN 627, 627–638 (1970); 
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of these rules and their application, a thoroughgoing theory as to 
what the rules are attempting to achieve proves elusive.  Recently, 
scholars have characterized the area of intestate succession as a 
“theoretical grab bag,” which is “so chock-full of ideas [that it] is, in 
practical consequence, evacuated of content” and which “serves to 
justify nothing—or anything at all.”3  Two theories, however, gener-
ally motivate and underlie the rules of intestacy: the “presumed will” 
theory and the “duty” theory.  The first follows the maxim that the 
presumed intent of the decedent is the “pole star” by which intestacy 
statutes must steer.4  The second looks not to what the decedent 
would have intended had he expressed his preferences but rather to 
how society thinks an individual’s property ought to be distributed.5
A. The “Presumed Will” Theory 
The presumed will theory asserts that the rules of intestacy dis-
tribute property according to the objects of the decedent’s natural 
affection and consequently fulfill the presumed wishes of the dece-
dent.  For example, children are listed first in an intestacy scheme, 
perhaps, because most decedent-parents wish their estates to devolve 
to their children.6  This principle has gained much modern currency 
Vladimir Gsovski, Family and Inheritance in Soviet Law, 7 RUSSIAN REV. 71, 71–87 
(1947). 
 3 Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its Context, 
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1036–37 (2004); see also John H. Beckstrom, Sociobiology and 
Intestate Wealth Transfers, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 216, 217 (1981) (“Various possible pur-
poses behind intestate succession laws have been listed by commentators.”). 
 4 4 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 537 (6th ed. 1848).  Although 
the exact quotation from Kent applies to the courts’ interpretation of devises, the 
aphorism applies equally, mutatis mutandis, to the law of intestacy. 
 5 See, e.g., Thomas E. Atkinson, Succession Among Collaterals, 20 IOWA L. REV. 185, 
187 (1935) (stating that individuals who are “more apt to be dependent on the intes-
tate in the average case should be preferred to those not so likely to be dependent”) 
(emphasis added). 
 6 The presumed will theory, however, is subject to an important limitation.  In 
Trimble v. Gordon, the United States Supreme Court emphasized that intestacy laws, 
irrespective of their motivations, are the product of state acts.  430 U.S. 762, 775 n.16 
(1977).  As such, they are subject to the limitation in the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Id.  Thus, the Court stated: 
Even if one assumed that a majority of the citizens of the State pre-
ferred to discriminate against their illegitimate children, the sentiment 
hardly would be unanimous.  With respect to any individual, the argu-
ment of knowledge and approval of the state law is sheer fiction.  The 
issue therefore becomes where the burden of inertia in writing a will is 
to fall.  At least when the disadvantaged group has been a frequent tar-
get of discrimination, as illegitimates have, we doubt that a State consti-
tutionally may place the burden on that group by invoking the theory 
of “presumed intent.” 
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and is historically well-situated.  The most recent version of the Uni-
form Probate Code (the “UPC”)7 explicitly states that its provisions 
on intestacy are an attempt “to reflect the normal desire of the owner 
of the wealth as to the disposition of his property at death.”8  This is 
not just the prevailing trend of the times.  At least as far back as 
Grotius, this theory was well advanced.9  In fact, Treillhard, the Coun-
sellor of State at the time the French Civil Code was presented to the 
legislature, declared that “[t]he legislation on successions is the pre-
sumed testament of every person who dies without having validly ex-
pressed a different will.”10  Treillhard spoke of the necessity of the 
legislation to “dictate as the deceased himself would have dictated at 
the last instant of his life, if he had been able and willing to express 
himself.”11  More modern scholars have concurred and argued that 
the function of intestacy “should be to act as a will substitute when a 
citizen dies intestate; therefore, its distribution pattern should pat-
tern what people desire to do in distributing an estate.”12
B. The “Duty” Theory 
The second theory is quite different.  Instead of the belief that 
the rules on intestacy ought to mirror the intent of the deceased—
Id. (citing Eskra v. Morton, 524 F.2d 9, 12–14 (7th Cir. 1975)). 
 7 The Uniform Probate Code is the most popular and influential uniform statute 
in the United States on the topic of successions.  It was first approved in 1969.  Arti-
cle II on intestacy was rewritten and reapproved in 1990. 
 8 UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, pt. 1 gen. cmt. (1969); see also MODEL PROBATE 
CODE § 22 cmt. (1946) (“[Any scheme of intestate succession] should in the main 
express what the typical intestate would have wished had he expressed his desires in 
the form of a will or otherwise.”). 
 9 2 HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE ch. 7 (1625).  Although Grotius 
recognized the obligation of support to certain family members, he ultimately con-
cluded “intestate succession . . . has its origin in natural inference as to the wishes of 
the deceased.”  Id. 
 10 J-R. TRAHAN, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW: DONATIONS AND SUCCESSIONS 365 (3d ed. 
2004) (quoting 1 GEORGES ANTOINE CHABOT, COMMENTAIRE SUR LA LOI DES 
SUCCESSIONS no. 12, at 8–10 (5th ed. 1818)); see also WM. F. WOERNER & F.A. 
WISLIZENUS, THE LAW OF DESCEDENTS’ ESTATES INCLUDING WILLS 53 (1913) (“In de-
fault of the testamentary disposition of the property of a deceased person, the law 
disposes of the same precisely as the deceased himself would do if acting rationally, 
and without motive or influence of an extraneous nature.”). 
 11 TRAHAN, supra note 10, at 365. 
 12 Joel R. Glucksman, Intestate Succession in New Jersey: Does It Conform to Popular Ex-
pectations?, 12 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 253, 266 (1976); see also E. Gary Spitko, The 
Expressive Function of Succession Law and the Merits of Non-Marital Inclusion, 41 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 1063, 1070 (1999) (“Intestacy statutes generally seek to further the testamentary 
freedom. . . .  These statutes do so by attempting to approximate the distributive 
scheme that the decedent likely would have chosen had she acted to provide for the 
distribution of her estate at her death.”). 
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had he made a will—this second theory, sometimes called the “duty” 
theory, is concerned with the intent of the deceased “not so much ac-
cording to what it was, as according to what it ought to have been, 
and agreeably to the Rules of Duty.”13  This theory appears to have 
had more adherents, at least early on, in the civil law than in the 
common law.  Pufendorf, Toullier, and Planiol are only a few of the 
many adherents to this theory.  In fact, some authors have argued 
that laws regulating intestacy preceded the existence of testaments 
and are connected more with the concept of the “community of fam-
ily” than with a decedent’s “presumed will.”14  Others claim that “it is 
on the duties of the deceased, rather than on his affections, that the 
order of succession ought to be regulated.”15
In the twentieth century, however, the “duty” theory of intestacy 
has experienced a resurgence—this time in the Anglo-American 
common law world.  In the 1930s, Professor Atkinson advocated a 
version of this theory by asserting that one of the goals of every intes-
tacy plan should be to prefer those who are more apt to be depend-
ent on the decedent.16  Moreover, in a much-cited 1978 survey of in-
testate preferences, the authors concluded that there were four 
societal aims of intestacy law, including protecting the dependent 
family and encouraging the nuclear family.17  Finally, the authors of a 
national Trust and Estate textbook add an additional purpose: “to 
produce a pattern of distribution that the recipients believe is fair 
and thus doesn’t produce disharmony within the surviving family 
members or disdain for the legal system.”18
 13 4 SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS 373 (1672).  As 
the name indicates, this second theoretical foundation for intestacy has been charac-
terized as a “natural law” argument, but such a characterization is not a necessary 
conclusion.  Although natural law may certainly impose limitations on how property 
ought to be distributed at death, so too might secular views of public policy.  For ex-
ample, parents may have a moral obligation to support their children imposed upon 
them by the dictates of a supreme being or in their very capacity as parents who cre-
ated a child.  At the same time, general public policy of not allowing parents to leave 
their children to be wards of the state may create such a duty.  Either rationale, natu-
ral law or public policy, might support an intestacy scheme that lists children as the 
primary recipients of a parent’s estate in intestacy.  See also Estate of Ford, 552 So. 2d 
1065, 1067 (Miss. 1989) (“Our fundamental premise is that there is no natural law of 
inheritance.  Intestate succession via descent and distribution is purely a function of 
the positive law of the state.”) (citing Jones v. Stubbs, 434 So. 2d 1362 (Miss. 1983)). 
 14 3 MARCEL PLANIOL, TRAITÉ ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL, No. 1700, at 495 (La. 
St. L. Inst. trans., 11th ed. 1959). 
 15 TRAHAN, supra note 10, at 367 (quoting 2 C.B.M. TOULLIER, LE DROIT CIVIL 
FRANCAIS nos. 127–129, at 81–83 (J.B. Duvergier, 6th ed. 1846–48)). 
 16 Atkinson, supra note 5, at 187. 
 17 Fellows, Simon, & Rau, supra note 1, at 351. 
 18 WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 1, at 38. 
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Because these two theories19 have historically tended to produce 
the same outcome, at least in the most important and common situa-
tions, no great debate has raged as to which theory is more important 
and primary.  For example, when a decedent is survived by his chil-
dren and any other relative, most decedents want their estate distrib-
uted to their children.  Similarly, for reasons of support and parental 
obligation, children are the very same individuals who ought to re-
ceive the estate.20  When the reverse happens, however, i.e., when a 
child dies and is survived by his parents, the two theories frequently 
diverge.  It is this divergence that this Paper explores. 
II. PARENTS UNDER INTESTACY  
In intestacy situations, parents figure in many different regards.  
A child may die survived only by parents.  In that case, the parents 
will receive the entirety of the child’s estate.  Similarly, a child may 
die survived by his parents and by children of his own.  In that case, 
the decedent’s children are the recipients of the decedent’s estate.21  
Neither of the above cases, however, is fruitful for discussion because 
the duty theory and the presumed will theory seem to be in accord 
and no evidence exists to suggest otherwise.  Three other instances in 
which parents survive children are, however, fertile sources to ascer-
tain what societal values and policies are embedded in the intestacy 
provisions.  The first situation involves the death of a decedent who is 
survived by both a surviving spouse and one or more parents; the sec-
ond concerns a decedent who has no surviving spouse, but who is 
survived by both parents and siblings; and the third instance entails 
situations in which a decedent is survived by parents who would in-
herit from their child, if not for their status as “bad parents.” 
 19 By limiting the discussion in this Paper to the “presumed will” and the “duty” 
theories, this Paper does not assert that no other theories of intestacy exist.  In fact, 
many others do exist.  See, e.g., PETER STEIN, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS: THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 173 (1984) (“The aim of the rules of succession in Roman 
law was to ensure the continuance of the family into the next generation after the 
death of the family head.”); Beckstrom, supra note 3, at 216–70 (discussing a sociobi-
ological theory of intestacy).  The theories discussed in this Paper, however, are the 
most dominant and influential in the United States. 
 20 This is not to suggest that the prevailing approach in states of awarding the 
spouse the inheritance rather than the children when both survive is incorrect.  For 
elaboration of this situation and the underlying principles, see infra Part III.B.2. 
 21 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.3 
cmt. b (1999) (“In the absence of a surviving spouse, the law of all states awards the 
entire intestate estate to the decedent’s descendants.”). 
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A. Surviving Spouse and Parents 
When a decedent is survived by a surviving spouse and parents, 
two general approaches exist throughout the United States: that in 
which a spouse excludes parents and that in which a surviving spouse 
does not.  As will be seen, the dominant trend is to allow parents to 
share with a surviving spouse, at least in some sense.  This trend is 
based not upon the preferences of the majority of society, but upon 
conceptions of a child’s duty to his parents. 
1. Current Approaches 
a. Surviving Spouse Excludes Parents 
The first approach is the least charitable to parents, because it 
excludes them altogether when a spouse survives a decedent.  
Twenty-one states take this approach: Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Illi-
nois, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Mississippi, New Mexico, 
New York, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.22  In any one 
of these states, a $1,000,000 estate would go entirely to the surviving 
spouse, with the parent or parents receiving nothing. 
b. Surviving Spouse Does Not Exclude Parents 
The second group of states does not exclude parents from in-
heritance merely because a surviving spouse exists.  Within this broad 
classification, however, at least three main variants (i.e., the Modern 
UPC Approach, the Former UPC Approach, and the Remainder) ex-
ist. 
i. Modern UPC Approach 
According to the most recent version of the UPC (the “Modern 
UPC Approach”), which has been adopted by a significant number of 
states, when a decedent is survived by a spouse and one or more par-
ents, the first $200,000 of his estate is distributed to his surviving 
 
 22 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2102 (1994); FLA. STAT. § 732.102 (2001); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 53-2-1 (1996); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1 (West 1976); IOWA CODE § 
633.211 (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-504 (1994); MINN. STAT. § 524.2-102 (2002); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-1-7 (1930); MO. ANN. STAT. § 474.010 (West 1992 & 2006 
Supp.); N.M. STAT. § 45-2-102 (1975); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 4-1.1 (McKinney 
1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.06 (West 2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.035 (2005); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-102 (1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-102 (1995); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 31-2-104 (1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-102 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 
64.1-1 (1990); W. VA. CODE § 42-1-3 (1990); WIS. STAT. § 852.01 (2002); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 2-4-101 (1985). 
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spouse, and the remaining estate is distributed three-fourths to the 
surviving spouse and one-fourth to his parents.23  Thus, an estate 
composed of $1,000,000 in which a surviving spouse and one parent 
of the decedent exist would be distributed $800,000 ($200,000 + 
$600,000 (i.e., three-fourths of $800,000)) to the surviving spouse and 
$200,000 (i.e., one-fourth of $800,000) to the surviving parent.24  
Alaska,25 Colorado,26 Hawaii,27 Montana,28 North Dakota,29 and New 
Jersey30 have all adopted the Modern UPC Approach.  With minor 
variation, New Hampshire and Michigan are included in this group 
too, with New Hampshire increasing the fixed dollar amount to 
$250,00031 and Michigan decreasing the amount to $150,000.32  The 
District of Columbia, Indiana, and Washington also fall into this class, 
as they maintain the same fractional distribution of the Modern UPC 
Approach, but eliminate any fixed dollar award to the surviving 
spouse.33
ii. Former UPC Approach 
The second major approach taken in the United States is even 
more favorable toward surviving parents.  This approach is endorsed 
by the first version of the UPC, prior to its revision in 1990 (the 
“Former UPC Approach”), and awards the first $50,000 to the surviv-
ing spouse and then divides the remainder of the estate in half be-
tween the spouse and the parents.  For example, in the same hypo-
thetical above involving a $1,000,000 estate, the surviving spouse 
would receive $525,000 ($50,000 + $475,000 (i.e. one-half of 
$950,000)) and the parent of the decedent would receive $475,000.  
Maine34 and Nebraska35 still maintain this approach, with California36, 
 
 23 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102 (1990). 
 24 For simplicity purposes, this hypothetical assumes that there are no applicable 
federal or state taxes or any other claims that might diminish the estate. 
 25 ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.102 (1996). 
 26 COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-102 to 103 (1995). 
 27 HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-102 (1997). 
 28 MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-112 (1993). 
 29 N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-02 (1993). 
 30 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-3 (West 2004). 
 31 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 561:1 (2003). 
 32 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2102 (2002). 
 33 D.C. CODE § 19-302 (2000); IND. CODE § 29-1-2-1 (2005); WASH. REV. CODE § 
11.04.015 (1974) (for separate property). 
 34 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-102 (2003). 
 35 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2302 (1980). 
 36 CAL. PROB. CODE § 6401 (West 1991) (awarding one-half of the separate prop-
erty to the surviving spouse and one-half to any parent, parents, or issue of them). 
SCALISEFINAL.DOC 10/20/2006  11:41:33 AM 
2006] HONOR THY FATHER AND MOTHER? 179 
Idaho37, and Nevada38 awarding a full one-half of the separate prop-
erty to the parents, without regard to the initial fixed sum.  Ala-
bama,39 Connecticut,40 Massachusetts,41 Maryland,42 Pennsylvania,43 
and Vermont44 also maintain this distributive pattern, but vary the ini-
tial fixed-dollar award within a range of $200,000 to $15,000. 
iii. The Remainder 
Finally, eight states have adopted an approach which does not fit 
into either of the above paradigms.  Briefly, these remaining states 
can be divided into five, sometimes overlapping, subcategories.  The 
first is a group of four states that retains the distinction between real 
and personal property and assigns different rights based upon the 
classification of the property existing in the estate.  States included in 
the first group are Delaware, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and 
Texas.45  All states in this group, however, allow parents, at least in 
 
 37 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-102 (2001). 
 38 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134.050 (LexisNexis 2006) (awarding one-half of the 
separate property to the surviving spouse and one-half to any parent or parents or 
issue of them). 
 39 ALA. CODE § 43-8-41 (1982) (awarding the first $100,000 to the surviving 
spouse). 
 40 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-437 (West 1992) (awarding the first $100,000 to 
the surviving spouse). 
 41 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190, § 1 (1986) (awarding the first $200,000 to the surviv-
ing spouse). 
 42 MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-102 (West 1991) (awarding the first $15,000 
to the surviving spouse). 
 43 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2102 (West 1975 & 2006 Supp.) (awarding the first 
$30,000 to the surviving spouse).  Pennsylvania appears to be unique in providing in 
its intestacy law that notwithstanding the provisions on intestate inheritance, “in the 
case of a decedent who died as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
a surviving spouse shall be entitled to 100% of any compensation award paid pursu-
ant to the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act.”  Id. 
 44 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 551 (1971) (awarding the first $25,000 to the surviving 
spouse). 
 45 Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 502 (2001) (awarding the surviving spouse the first 
$50,000 of the personal property plus one-half of the balance of personal property, 
and a life estate in the realty); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-14 (2001) (awarding the surviving 
spouse one-half of real property and the first $50,000 plus one-half of the excess of 
personal property); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 33-1-1 & 33-1-5 (1956) (awarding the surviving 
spouse the first $50,000 of the personal property plus one-half of the balance of per-
sonal property, and a life estate in the realty); Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 38 (Vernon 
2003) (awarding the surviving spouse all the personal property and one-half of the 
separate realty, with the remainder of the estate to be distributed to the decedent’s 
parents or siblings).  Although some other states such as Kentucky technically fall 
within this scheme, the fractional distribution of personalty and realty is half for 
both, making the distinction functionally irrelevant for the purposes of this Paper.  
See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 392.020, 391.010 & 391.030 (West 2002). 
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some instances, to share with a surviving spouse.  The second sub-
category of states awards parents future rights, rather than present 
ones, in a decedent’s estate.  Delaware and Rhode Island fall into this 
second subgroup and award parents a remainder interest at the ter-
mination of a life interest held by the surviving spouse in certain 
property.46  The third subcategory follows the Former UPC Ap-
proach, but assigns only a one-third interest rather than a one-half in-
terest in the intestate estate to the surviving spouse. Here, Oklahoma 
stands alone.47  The fourth subclassification is particular to Arkansas, 
which maintains dower and curtesy provisions under which a surviv-
ing spouse receives a one-half interest in non-ancestral real property 
and a one-half interest in personal property of the decedent, in addi-
tion to a one-half interest in the remaining estate if the surviving 
spouse and decedent have been married less than three years.48  Fi-
nally, the fifth group allows parents to succeed in preference to the sur-
viving spouse, at least in some instances.  Louisiana and Kentucky 
make up this group.  In Kentucky, a parent is second in line behind a 
decedent’s descendants, while a spouse comes fourth in line behind 
descendants, parents, and siblings, at least in the case of real estate.49  
Similarly, in Louisiana, if no descendants exist, a decedent’s parents 
and siblings share in his separate property ahead of a surviving 
spouse.50
2. The Trend and Rationale 
In summary, the states are about evenly divided between those in 
which a surviving spouse excludes parents and those in which parents 
share—at least in some percentage—with the surviving spouse.  Of 
those states that split the estate between the parents and the surviving 
spouse, eleven have opted for the Modern UPC Approach, which 
awards the parents one-fourth of the estate, after distributing an ini-
 
 46 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 502 (2001) (awarding the surviving spouse the first 
$50,000 of the personal property plus one-half of the balance of personal property, 
and a life estate in the realty); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 33-1-1 & 33-1-5 (1956) (awarding the 
surviving spouse the first $50,000 of the personal property plus one-half of the bal-
ance of personal property, and a life estate in the realty). 
 47 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 213 (West 1994). 
 48 See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-11-307 & 28-9-214 (1987).  Where the couple has 
been married three years or more, the surviving spouse takes the entire estate.  Id. § 
28-9-214. See generally Lawrence H. Averill, Jr. & Hon. Ellen B. Brantley, Comparison of 
Arkansas’s Current Law Concerning Succession, Wills, and Other Donative Transfers With 
Article II of the 1990 Uniform Probate Code, 17 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 631, 643–47 
(1995). 
 49 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.010 (West 2003). 
 50 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 891–94 (2000). 
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tial fixed dollar sum to the surviving spouse, and another eleven 
states have elected to follow the Former UPC Approach of giving the 
parents a full one-half share in the estate, after subtraction of a fixed 
dollar amount. 
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that all states have 
thoroughly debated the issue in recent times and simply come to dif-
ferent conclusions about the appropriate share parents ought to re-
ceive.  On the contrary, the divergence appears to be the result of the 
sporadic rate of legislative action and the inertial pull of history.  Of 
the states in which a surviving spouse precludes parental inheritance, 
the mean amount of time that has passed since the last amendment 
to those statutory provisions is 19.10 years.51  On the other hand, for 
states adopting the Former UPC Approach, the mean number of 
years since amendment is 14.09.52  And finally, the mean number of 
years that have passed since amendment to the statute in states adopt-
ing the Modern UPC Approach is only 8.18.53  This lends credence to 
the idea that the states that continue to exclude parents do so largely 
as a result of history.54  The modern trend is clearly in favor of allow-
ing parents to share with the surviving spouse. 
Given the modern trend away from the old approach that totally 
excluded parents, the motivation for this trend must be ascertained.  
The official comment to the current UPC provision on this issue, sec-
tion 2-102, provides little guidance, other than stating that “[t]his sec-
tion is revised to give the surviving spouse a larger share than the pre-
1990 UPC.”55  Empirical studies, the comment recounts, support this 
trend.56  Given this rationale, it is surprising that the surviving spouse 
is not awarded the entire estate to the exclusion of parents.  Some 
states, such as Missouri, which have recently revised their intestacy law 
to exclude parents when a spouse survives, have noted that the 
 
 51 The above number was obtained by calculating the mean number of years be-
tween the last amendment to the relevant statute and June 1, 2006.  This calculation 
is not an attempt to ascertain when each state adopted its table of descent and distri-
bution, but is instead only a rough guide as to when the legislature in the relevant 
states last took the opportunity to amend, in any way, the pertinent provisions. 
 52 See supra note 51. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Sources from Bracton to Blackstone recount the common law’s total exclusion 
of parents in intestacy.  MATHEW HALE, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 
(1713). 
 55 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102 cmt. (1990). 
 56 Id. 
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change is “long overdue” and brings the law into “line with common 
preferences.”57
Lawrence Waggoner,58 the reporter for the UPC revision, pro-
vides insight.59  In his much celebrated article, The Multiple-Marriage 
Society and Spousal Rights Under the Revised Uniform Probate Code, he 
questions: “Why not officially grant the surviving spouse the entire in-
testate estate when the decedent is childless but leaves a surviving 
parent?”60  Thankfully, he next answers the question: 
The rationale is that a childless decedent survived by a spouse and 
a parent, and who dies intestate with an estate significantly in ex-
cess of $243,000, [i.e., the fixed dollar amount awardable to the 
surviving spouse along with applicable probate exemptions and 
allowances] most likely died at a fairly young age without expect-
ing such a large estate . . . .  An intestate estate of this size likely 
consists of a large tort recovery.61
To further explain, he poses a hypothetical situation involving 
two fictitious individuals, Ben and Elaine: 
Suppose that shortly after their marriage, Ben was injured on his 
way to work by a negligent truck driver employed by a large, pub-
licly held corporation, and that Ben eventually died from those in-
juries. Ben’s estate, swelled by a tort recovery stemming from the 
accident, amounted to a million dollars.  Disregarding the pro-
bate exemptions and allowances for the sake of simplicity, the 
formula adopted has the advantage of granting Elaine, who might 
well remarry, a thoroughly adequate share of $800,000 ($200,000 
plus $600,000), with a $200,000 return to Ben’s parents, who bore 
the cost of raising and educating Ben.62
Thus, the rationale appears to be two-fold: (1) the property may 
be from a tort recovery and not the product of marital effort, and (2) 
the UPC scheme provides the surviving spouse with “a thoroughly 
adequate share” with the remainder going to the decedent’s parents, 
“who bore the cost of raising and educating”63 the decedent.  Unfor-
tunately, it is not immediately apparent which of the two theories of 
 
 57 4 FRANCIS M. HANNA, PROBATE CODE MANUAL ch. 474 (MO. PRAC. SERIES 2d ed. 
2000). 
 58 Professor Waggoner is director of research and chief reporter of Joint Editorial 
Board for the Uniform Probate Code and reporter for the Drafting Committee to 
Revise Article II of the Uniform Probate Code. 
 59 Lawrence Waggoner, The Multiple-Marriage Society and Spousal Rights Under the 
Revised Uniform Probate Code, 76 IOWA L. REV. 223, 231 n.32 (1991). 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 231–32 n.32. (internal citations omitted). 
 62 Id. at 232 n.32. 
 63 Id. 
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intestacy are endorsed by the above rationales.  Although they may 
track the presumed wills of decedents, the total absence of any lan-
guage suggesting Ben’s preference and the normative tone of the ex-
ample suggests the duty theory is operational. 
Empirical studies64 detailing the actual preferences of individuals 
with regard to their estates are helpful in ascertaining which theory of 
intestacy explains the trend of parental inclusion.  One such study 
examined dispositive preferences of Iowans by soliciting responses to 
a series of hypotheticals.65  Two questions were asked with regard to 
situations in which a decedent was survived by parents and a surviving 
spouse.66  The first inquired as to the dispositive preference of the 
decedent if his parents were “financially secure,” and the second 
asked for the preference of a decedent if the parents were “less well-
 64 Some of the empirical studies relied upon in this Paper are based upon per-
sonal or telephone interviews regarding the dispositive preferences of individuals. 
See, e.g., Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 1, at 326–32; Fellows, Simon, Snapp & 
Snapp, supra note 1, at 720–22; SUSSMAN, CATES & SMITH, supra note 1, at 36–61 (ex-
amining probate court records and conducting interviews); Contemporary Studies 
Project, A Comparison of Iowans’ Dispositive Preferences with Selected Provisions of the Iowa 
and Uniform Probate Codes, 63 IOWA L. REV. 1041, 1052–54 (1978) (examining probate 
files and conducting a public opinion poll); Glucksman, supra note 12, at 254–56, 
261–62 (performing will studies and conducting interviews).  Others relied upon 
probate record examinations or will studies.  See, e.g., Dunham, supra note 1, at 241–
42; Ward & Beuscher, supra note 1, at 393–94; Olin L. Browder, Jr., Recent Patterns of 
Testate Succession in the United States and England, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1303, 1303–04 
(1969); Glucksman, supra note 12, at 254–56, 261–62 (performing will studies and 
conducting interviews); SUSSMAN, CATES & SMITH, supra note 1, at 36–61 (examining 
probate court records and conducting interviews); Price, supra note 1, at 285–89; 
Contemporary Studies Project, supra at 1052–54 (examining probate files and con-
ducting a public opinion poll).  Neither approach is without problems.  The drafters 
of wills are subject to influences by lawyers and other advisors that may be motivated 
by cultural standards, rather than an individual’s actual desires.  Also, probate re-
cords and wills are likely to emphasize disproportionately the preferences of wealthy, 
well-educated Americans over the poorer, less educated who are more likely to die 
without wills and with estates too small to undergo administration.  On the other 
hand, interviews are problematic insofar as they impose unreasonable time restric-
tions on individuals deciding how to dispose hypothetically of their estate.  They also 
require a significant degree of personal extrapolation by interviewees about how they 
would want their property distributed if they were to die.  See generally Beckstrom, su-
pra note 3, at 2–6.  Some studies have acknowledged the problems with both ap-
proaches yet have found, at least in a limited context, little difference in the out-
come, regardless of the approach employed.  See, e.g., Johnson & Robbennolt, supra 
note 1 (concluding that “in the current study, for those respondents who had wills, 
there was a close correspondence between the respondent’s will and his or her stated 
distributed preference on the hypothetical scenarios”).  In the end, the empirical 
studies relied upon in this Paper are the same ones relied upon by the drafters of the 
revised Uniform Probate Code and, by default, the legislatures of many American 
States.  See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102 cmt. (1990). 
 65 Contemporary Studies Project, supra note 64, at 1041–1152. 
 66 Id. 
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off.”67  In both cases, a majority of respondents preferred giving 100% 
of the estate to the surviving spouse.68  In the case of “financially se-
cure” parents, the absolute preference for the surviving spouse was 
overwhelming, with seventy-three percent of the respondents giving 
all to the surviving spouse and only eight percent allocating anything 
to the parents.69  The response was so overwhelming that the authors 
indicate that “[t]his was the highest percentage of respondents giving 
100 percent of the estate to the spouse of any hypothetical survivor 
situation examined in the survey.”70  Even in cases where the parents 
were designated as “not well-off financially,” a majority still favored 
awarding 100% of the estate to the surviving spouse.71
Furthermore, a more recent and comprehensive empirical sur-
vey conducted in 1978 surveyed respondents in five states (Alabama, 
California, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Texas) and confirmed the re-
sults of the Iowa study.72  The authors asked respondents to 
“[i]ndicate the percentage of your estate that you would want to give 
each survivor if you are survived by your wife/husband and your 
mother.”73  Again, an overwhelming majority of respondents favored 
awarding the entirety of the estate to the surviving spouse, with 70.8% 
of respondents “favor[ing] disinheriting the mother and distributing 
the property entirely to the spouse.”74  In fact, respondents in all five 
states surveyed preferred such a distribution pattern, with respon-
dents in Ohio even more inclined than respondents in other states to 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 1099–1100, 1124,  1138 App. B. 
 70 Id. at 1099–1100. 
 71 Contemporary Studies Project, supra note 64, at 1124.  Other studies confirm 
these results.  For example, a 1976 telephone survey of 182 Chicago residents re-
vealed the same preference as that of Iowans.  When asked what division of the estate 
respondents would allocate if survived only by a surviving spouse and one or both 
parents, 54.4% of respondents would award the entire estate to the surviving spouse 
when the choice was between a mother and a surviving spouse; 59.7% to the surviv-
ing spouse, as between a father and a surviving spouse; and 58.6% to the surviving 
spouse when both a father and a mother were in existence.  A majority of both gen-
ders of respondents favors the surviving spouse to the exclusion of either parent.  
The strongest preference for exclusion occurs with the subgroup of deceased hus-
bands survived by their wives and fathers, with 83.7% preferring total exclusion of 
the father.  See Fellows, Simon, Snapp & Snapp, supra note 1, at 726–27, 734–35. 
 72 Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 1, at 348–55. 
 73 Id. at 351.  The authors indicate that the term “mother” rather than “parent” 
was used because, in their view, the mother is “traditionally less likely to be thought 
of as self sufficient.”  Id.  And, correspondingly, if the respondents prefer the spouse 
to the mother, a logical inference was that they would also prefer the spouse to the 
father or to siblings.  Id. 
 74 Id. 
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award the entirety to the surviving spouse.75  The authors found no 
significant correlation between family income and preference in this 
regard.76
Thus, as is evident, the best empirical data on the dispositive 
preferences of individuals suggests that parents should not receive 
the large distributions sometimes provided by modern intestacy law.  
This appears to be the preference in almost all circumstances, irre-
spective of both the financial need of parents and an individual de-
cedent’s wealth.  Given the clear preference among individuals, the 
dominant trend in intestacy law—at least for parents and surviving 
spouses—can only be explained as an endorsement and application 
of the duty theory, rather than the presumed will theory. 
B. Parents and Siblings 
As with the situation in which one or more parents and a spouse 
survive a decedent, instances in which one or more parents and a sib-
ling (but no spouse) survive a decedent also provide a window into 
the general policies and rationales of the laws of intestacy.  Here, 
unlike above, only two main approaches exist in the fifty states.  In 
some states, parents exclude siblings and in others, parents share with 
siblings.  Again, the dominant approach is the former, and for rea-
sons of duty rather than reasons of individual preference. 
 75 Id. The corresponding percentage of respondents awarding the entirety of the 
estate to the surviving spouse by state are as follows: Alabama, 64%; California, 
75.5%; Massachusetts, 64.3%; Ohio, 82.8%; Texas, 72.3%.  Fellows, Simon & Rau, 
supra note 1, at 351. 
 76 Id. at 353.  Interestingly enough, the Fellows, Simon, and Rau study found that 
those with the largest estates (i.e., $100,000 and over) demonstrated the strongest 
preference for favoring the surviving spouse, with 80.2% of respondents in this group 
desiring to leave their entire estate to their surviving spouse.  One of the purposes of 
intestate schemes that award to a surviving spouse a large fixed dollar amount and a 
fraction of the remainder is to exhaust or nearly exhaust small estates in favor of sur-
viving spouses.   Large estates, however, are more likely to be split between parents 
and a spouse.  The evidence from the Fellows, Simon, and Rau study suggests the 
current UPC approach does not track the dominant preference.  But see Sussman, 
Cates & Smith, supra note 1, at 89 (concluding that in the case of a decedent sur-
vived by both a spouse and one or more parents, a “large majority of testators altered 
the [intestate] distribution by bequeathing all to the surviving spouse,” but finding 
the mean and median net estates for those willing all to their surviving spouses was 
smaller than those who preferred other distribution schemes). 
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1. Current Approaches 
a. Parents Exclude Siblings 
In the absence of descendants and a surviving spouse, most 
states list parents as next in line to receive an intestate child’s estate.77  
Both the Modern UPC Approach and the Former UPC Approach 
endorse this outcome.  Similarly, the Restatement (Third) of Prop-
erty lists parents as the next in line to inherit after the surviving 
spouse and descendants.78  Only in the absence of both parents are 
the siblings of the decedent considered in the inheritance scheme.  
The statutes in forty-three states preclude the decedent’s siblings 
from representing a deceased parent and thus allow for the survival 
of even one parent to exclude all of a decedent’s siblings from inheri-
tance.79
b. Parents Share with Siblings 
Seven states, however, allow siblings to share with parents in the 
absence of descendants.  Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, Texas, and Wyoming are included in this category.  About half 
of these seven states allow parents and siblings to share equally.  The 
 77 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103 (1990). 
 78 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.4 
(1999). 
 79 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS 
AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.4; ALA. CODE §§ 43-8-42 (1991); ALASKA STAT. § 
13.12.103 (2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2103 (1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-214 
(2004); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402.5 (West 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-103 
(West 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45A-439 (West 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 
503 (2001); D.C. CODE § 19-308 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.103 (West 2005); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 53-2-1 (1997 & 2005 Supp.); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-103 (2005); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 15-2-103 (2001); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.219 (West 1992 & 2005 Supp.); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-507 (1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.010 (West 2003); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-103 (1998); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-104 (West 
2001 & 2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190, § 3 (2004) (real property); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 700.2103 (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-103 (West 2002); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 72-2-113 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2303 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 134.050 (West 2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 561:1 (1997 & 2004 Supp.); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 3B:5-4 (West 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-103 (West 1978); N.Y. EST. 
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1 (McKinney 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-15 (2003); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-03 (1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.06 (West 2005); OKL. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 213 (West 1990); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 112.045 (West 2003); 20 
PA. STAT. ANN. § 2103 (West 1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1-1 (2006) (real estate); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 62-2-103 (1976 & 2004 Supp.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-103 (1997); 
TENN. CODE. ANN. § 31-2-104 (West 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-103 (West 1953 & 
2004 Supp.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 551 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-1 (West 2002); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.04.015 (West 1998) (for separate property); W.VA. CODE 
§ 42-1-3a (2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 852.01 (West 2002). 
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basic language of these statutes provides that in the absence of a sur-
viving spouse or descendant, the estate descends to “the brothers and 
sisters and father and mother of the intestate and the descendants of 
such brothers and sisters in equal parts.”80  Thus, in an instance in 
which a decedent was survived by a mother, two sisters, and a brother, 
a $1,000,000 estate would be divided $250,000 to each. 
Illinois and Texas, however, favor parents over siblings and allow 
siblings to succeed only in place of one or more predeceased parents. 
Although they vary in their application of the principle, both states 
allow siblings to succeed by virtue of representation of a parent. 81  
The final state, Louisiana, maintains a unique civil-law approach un-
der which surviving parents are granted rights in “usufruct” with “na-
ked ownership” devolving in equal shares to the decedent’s siblings.82  
Although the character of a parent’s rights in Louisiana can depend 
upon the classification of the property at issue,83 for simplicity’s sake, 
a parent in the $1,000,000 estate hypothetical would have the right to 
spend, invest, and draw interest and revenues from the $1,000,000, 
but would be obliged to return $1,000,000 at his death to the siblings 
of the decedent.84
2. The Trend and Rationale 
Although a handful of states allow siblings to share with parents, 
at least as early as 1976 scholars observed “[t]he trend is to grant pri-
 
 80 MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-1-3 (West 2004); see also IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-1 (West 
1999); MO. ANN. STAT. § 474.010 (West 1992); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-4-101 (1992). 
 81 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1 (West 1992 & 2005 Supp.).  Illinois divides the 
estate in equal shares with respect to who is alive and then grants a double share of 
the estate to a surviving parent if the other is predeceased. Thus, in the $1,000,000 
hypothetical, the mother would receive $400,000 and each of the three siblings 
$200,000.  In Texas, if only one parent has predeceased the decedent, half of the es-
tate (i.e., $500,000 in the $1,000,000 hypothetical) passes to the surviving parent, 
here the mother, and the other half to the siblings as a group, resulting in each of 
the three siblings receiving approximately $166,667.  See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 38 
(Vernon 2003). 
 82 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 891 (2000).  The right of usufruct is a civil law notion, 
under which the holder of the right, the usufructuary, is granted rights to use a thing 
and to derive fruits therefrom.   Naked ownership is a right that imposes duties of 
noninterference with respect to the usufruct and grants the naked owners an even-
tual right to full ownership of a thing at the death of the usufructuary.   The closest 
common law analogues to usufruct and naked ownership are life estate and remain-
der interests, respectively. 
 83 Compare LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 538 (1980), with, LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 539 
(1980) (discussing the different rights of a usufructuary based upon classification of 
the property at issue as consumable or nonconsumable). 
 84 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 538 (1980); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 891 (2000). 
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ority to parents over brothers and sisters and other collaterals.”85  
Even though the trend is clear in this area, the rationale is complex.  
The comments to the 1990 UPC indicate that this parental exclusion 
of siblings was not a new creation of the 1990 board, but a hold-over 
from the 1969 version.  Neither the revision86 nor the earlier version 
of the UPC provide any hint as to why the current rule was adopted. 
This is surprising because in 1946, at the time of the drafting of 
the Model Probate Code, the parents and siblings of a decedent were 
treated equally in the inheritance scheme.87  The explanation pro-
vided for this approach was that it was both the approach “commonly 
provided in statutes,”88 and the distribution that most closely tracks 
the purpose of the intestacy rules, i.e., to “express what the typical in-
testate would have wished had he expressed his desires in the form of 
a will or otherwise.”89
In the time intervening between the publication of the Model 
Probate Code and the creation of the UPC in 1969, a revised version 
of the Model Probate Code was completed in 1966.90  There, for the 
first time, a different approach was taken with regard to parents and 
siblings inheriting in intestacy.  When an unmarried decedent dies 
below the age of twenty-one, the drafters opted to award the entire 
estate to the parents of the decedent and exclude the siblings.91  “The 
thought behind this is that the estate of a minor is likely to have been 
derived from his parents or grandparents”92—an explanation sorely 
lacking in any discussion of intent.  Professor Powell, in his treatise 
on real property, further explains the rationale that probably moti-
vated the drafters of the UPC: 
Descendants and the surviving spouse constitute the primary 
group needing, and deserving, maintenance and whatever more 
than maintenance becomes available.  But increased longevity in-
creases the number of persons likely to die with living parents, 
and these surviving parents are themselves likely to be as of the 
decedent’s death, of more advanced years and of less physical 
 85 Verner F. Chaffin, Descent and Distribution—Inheritable Property and Relative Rights 
of Heirs and Administrator, in COMPARATIVE PROBATE LAW STUDIES 17, 30 (1976). 
 86 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103 cmt. (1990)  Under the section discussing the 
“Purpose and Scope of the Revisions” to this section, the comments indicate that the 
“revisions are stylistic and clarifying.” Id. 
 87 MODEL PROBATE CODE § 22(b)(2) (1946). 
 88 Id. § 22 cmt. 
 89 Id. 
 90 William F. Fratcher, Toward Uniform Succession Legislation, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1037, 1040 –41 (1966). 
 91 Id. at 1049–50. 
 92 Id. at 1049 n.52. 
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strength than in earlier decades.  In contrast with brothers and 
sisters, often widely scattered and living separate and unrelated 
lives, parents are likely to be, in general, closer to the decedent 
and socially more deserving of subsidy than the siblings.93
In other words, parents are favored because they tend, more of-
ten than not, to be geographically and emotionally closer to the de-
cedent, in addition to being “more deserving” of inheritance. This 
explanation suggests that both the presumed will and the duty theory 
might support the approach of the UPC. 
Empirical evidence suggests that such is not the case.  The 
dominant preference of decedents is exactly the opposite.  Most indi-
viduals, if survived by at least one parent and one sibling, prefer their 
parents and siblings to share in their inheritance, rather than to be-
stow an exclusive award to their parents.94  In the Fellows, Simon & 
Rau study examining public attitudes across five states, the authors 
discovered that in a situation in which a father, brother, and sister 
survived a decedent, only 29.2% of the respondents favored awarding 
all of the estate to a surviving parent.95  When the hypothetical in-
cluded both parents and the two siblings, the pattern did not 
change—only 31.9% favored splitting the estate between the parents 
and excluding the siblings, while 40.3% wanted to split the estate into 
fourths, with the father, mother, brother, and sister sharing equally.96  
The study further demonstrated that neither family income nor es-
tate size affect the above preferences.97
Despite evidence suggesting a continuing preference for siblings 
and parents to share in an estate, the laws of most states award the es-
tate to the parent of a decedent.  Again, at least in terms of the 
dominant approach, the duty theory triumphs over the presumed will 
theory, in departure from both history and the majoritarian prefer-
ence. 
 93 6 RICHARD POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY ¶ 997 (1970) (emphasis added). 
 94 Fellow, Simon & Rau, supra note 1, at 346. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id.  Although another 8.9% favored awarding the entire estate to one parent to 
the exclusion of the other parent and the siblings, 59.2% preferred some other dis-
tribution scheme in which siblings shared with parents.  Id. 
 97 Id. ; see also Fellows, Simon, Snapp & Snapp, supra note 1, at 724 (finding that 
in hypotheticals in which an individual is survived by both parents and two siblings, 
fifty percent of respondents favored excluding siblings and fifty percent favored in-
cluding them in some fractional distribution).  When the hypothetical was altered to 
provide only for survival by a father, brother, and sister, approximately sixty percent 
of respondents favored including one or both siblings in the distribution.  Id. at 724. 
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C. Bad Parent Statutes 
Although the two preceding examples are the core of parents’ 
rights in intestacy, one other situation is relevant to develop fully the 
parent/child relationship.  These situations involve the application of 
“bad parent” statutes or statutes in which society deems a parent to 
have acted so obnoxiously with respect to a child that he no longer 
merits inheritance from the child.98  Acts that tend to qualify under 
these “bad parent” statutes are ordinarily egregious ones such as 
abandonment, refusal to acknowledge the child, or acts that have re-
sulted in the termination of parental rights.  Although all states main-
tain approaches by which parental inheritance rights can be severed, 
a multiplicity of grounds for doing so exist among the states, as do a 
variety of effects as a result of such termination.99  For purposes of 
this Paper, the common element and effect of many of these statutes, 
however, is to punish “bad” parents for violations of parental duty and 
therefore to absolve a child of his inheritance duty toward his parents.  
Again, the duty theory reigns supreme. 
1. Current Approaches 
a. Open Acknowledgement and No Refusal of Support 
Both the Restatement (Third) of Property and the UPC contain 
“bad parent” provisions by which a parent’s inheritance rights may be 
terminated.  The Restatement (Third) of Property provides that “[a] 
parent who has refused to acknowledge or has abandoned his or her 
child . . . is barred from inheriting from or through the child.”100  
Similarly, the UPC also provides that “[i]nheritance from or through 
a child by either a natural parent or his [or her] kindred is precluded 
 
 98 In an article on this topic, Richard Lewis Brown has argued that these statutes 
should not be classified as “bad” parent statutes, as they include within their ambit 
parents who deserve no societal reproach but whose parental rights are terminated 
due to mental illness and similar conditions.   See Richard Lewis Brown, Undeserving 
Heirs?—The Case of the “Terminated” Parent, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 547, 569–78 (2006).  
For example, in In re Marcus W, the Nebraska Court of Appeals terminated the pa-
rental (and thus inheritance) rights of a mother with an IQ of seventy-three who 
“truly love[d] her children” and who had the “proceeding brought against her 
through no fault of her own.”  In re Marcus W, 649 N.W.2d 899, 913–14 (Neb. Ct. 
App. 2002).  Although Professor Brown is, of course, correct is his assessment of the 
range and applicability of these statutes, this article employs the nomenclature of 
“bad parent statutes” merely for purposes of simplicity of reference. 
 99 The federally enacted Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 requires states 
to terminate parental rights on certain grounds.  See 42 U.S.C. 670 (2000). 
 100 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5(5) 
(1999). 
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unless that natural parent has openly treated the child as his [or 
hers], and has not refused to support the child.”101  The former ver-
sion of the UPC is almost identical in its provision, except that it was 
limited to the fathers, and the newer version expands to include any 
natural parent.102  Thus, a biological mother is precluded from inher-
iting from a deceased child unless the mother has both openly ac-
knowledged the child and not refused him support.  A number of 
states have adopted the UPC approach either verbatim or in close 
approximation thereto.  These states include Alaska, Arizona, Colo-
rado, Hawaii, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, North 
Dakota, South Dakota, and Utah.103
For clarity’s sake, these types of “bad parent” statutes must be 
distinguished from filiation statutes.  Despite the language of some 
statutes, these penal “bad parent” statutes should not be mistaken for 
statutes that require specific proof of paternity or filiation to establish 
a parent/child relationship.  For example, Alaska’s “bad parent” stat-
ute provides that “[i]nheritance from or through a child by either 
natural parent . . . is precluded unless that natural parent has openly 
treated the child as the natural parent’s child, and has not refused to 
support the child.”104  This intestacy statute is separate and apart from 
a similar family law statute that allows for the admission of acknowl-
edgments and biological evidence to establish parentage.105  The “bad 
parent” statute may apply and preclude inheritance even after a bio-
logical link has established natural parentage of the child involved.  
Hence, in a Mississippi decision, Estate of Ford,106 the court held that 
even though there was “no doubt” as to the biological filiation of the 
parties, no inheritance was allowable because the plaintiffs failed to 
establish that the father of the child at issue “openly treated the child 
. . . as his” and that he “did not refuse or neglect to support” her.107
 
 101 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(c) (1990). 
 102 Id. § 2-114 cmt, subsection (c). 
 103 ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.114 (2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2114 (1995); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-114 (2005); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-114 (2005); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2114 (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-114 (West 2002)  
(modifies Revised UPC § 2-114 by providing that an adopted stepchild continues to 
be a child of his or her noncustodial natural parent only if the adoption occurred 
after the death of that natural parent); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-124 (2005); N.M. 
STAT. § 45-2-114 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-09 (1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 
29A-2-114 (1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-114 (1953 & 2004 Supp.). 
 104 ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.114. 
 105 Id. § 25.20.050. 
 106 552 So. 2d 1065 (Miss. 1989). 
 107 Id. at 1067–68; see also Estate of Richardson v. Cornes, 2002-CA-01485-COA (¶ 
23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that “the natural father, who has not fulfilled his 
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Thus, the primary aim of these “bad parent” statutes is not to es-
tablish a paternal link between the child and the person alleged to be 
the father.108  Instead, the purpose is to insure the acceptance of pa-
rental obligations for the child and to punish those who fail to do so.  
Bad parent statutes affirmatively cut off inheritance rights even after 
one has established the parental link.109
b. Conduct Against the Child 
Other states have adopted statutes with an even broader ambit to 
preclude parental inheritance.  For example, in addition to requiring 
support and open acknowledgment of a child, the Pennsylvania stat-
ute includes the commission of certain crimes, such as sexual abuse 
or endangerment of the welfare of the child as grounds for barring 
intestate inheritance.110  Hawaii has one of the broader statutes, 
which includes within the range of prohibited acts failure to “com-
municate with the child when able to do so for a period of at least 
one year when the child is in the custody of another.”111
Even outside the successions context, family law statutes often 
provide that sexual abuse against a child or abandonment may be 
grounds for termination of all parental rights.  These statutes are or-
dinarily premised on parental misconduct toward the child and fre-
quently include termination of inheritance rights as an effect of a 
 
obligations to acknowledge and support the child during the child's lifetime, is pre-
vented from enjoying the benefits of inheritance”), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, No. 
2002-CT-01485-SCT (Miss. 2005); Estate of Evjen v. Novotny, 448 N.W.2d 23, 24 
(Iowa 1989) (concluding that “proving paternity . . . is not enough to establish heir-
ship under section 633.222”). 
 108 Such a goal would be laudable, but it is expressly not the purpose of these pro-
visions.  As courts have noted, “[t]he legislature has a legitimate interest in adopting 
measures that minimize or avoid the difficult problems associated with proof of pa-
ternity.  The more serious problems of proving paternity might justify a more de-
manding standard for fathers claiming under their illegitimate children’s estates 
than that required for mothers claiming under the estates of their illegitimate chil-
dren.”  Estate of Hicks, 675 N.E.2d 89, 96 (Ill. 1996).  For example, in Louisiana, “[a] 
man who marries the mother of a child not filiated to another man and who, with 
the concurrence of the mother, acknowledges the child by authentic act or by sign-
ing the birth certificate is presumed to be the father of that child.”  LA. CIV. CODE 
ANN. art. 195 (2000 & 2006 Supp.).  This presumption is sufficient for inheritance by 
the father from the child. 
 109 Also, the wording of the provision of Revised Uniform Probate Code and the 
statutes in the states where it has been adopted explicitly precludes, in the absence of 
such acknowledgement, inheritance by a “natural parent.”  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-
114(c) (1990) (emphasis added). 
 110 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2106 (1975). 
 111 HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-103 (2005). 
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termination order.112  For example, Louisiana has no specific “bad 
parent” statute in the context of inheritance.  It does, however, have 
detailed provisions for the termination of all parental rights, includ-
ing the right of inheritance, for “[m]isconduct of the parent toward 
this child . . . which constitutes extreme abuse, cruel and inhuman 
treatment, or grossly negligent behavior below a reasonable standard 
of human decency.”113  Because these statutes serve, at least in part, 
the same function as the more narrowly tailored “bad parent” statutes 
in intestacy, their effects and their application are properly included 
in this analysis. 
c. Commission of Crimes Against the Other Parent 
A third group of states goes even further and includes crimes or 
conduct against the other parent as grounds for precluding inheri-
tance from the child.  For example, Maryland provides that rape or 
certain sexual crimes against a child or the other parent may be grounds 
for precluding intestate inheritance from the child.114  Other states 
such as Connecticut, Kentucky, Missouri, New York, and Pennsylvania 
have even broader laws that include abandonment of the other 
spouse or adultery as grounds for disinheritance from a deceased 
child.115
2. The Trend and Rationale 
The trend in this area is clear: the vast majority of states provide 
at least some mechanism for courts to terminate inheritance rights of 
“bad parents.”116  Moreover, the most influential doctrinal work in 
 
 112 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1583a(f) (2000) (“Upon . . . termination [of pa-
rental rights], all the rights of birth parents to such child, including their right to in-
herit from or through such child, shall cease.”).  But see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 
4056(1) (2004) (“An order terminating parental rights divests the parent and child 
of all legal rights, powers, privileges, immunities, duties and obligations to each other 
as parent and child, except the inheritance rights between the child and his par-
ent.”).  For a thorough discussion of this matter and other related issues, see Brown, 
supra note 98, at 569–78. 
 113 See LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1015(3) (2004).  On the effect of a judgment of 
termination of parental rights, see id. art. 1038. 
 114 MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-111(West 2001 & 2005 Supp.). 
 115 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-436(g) (West 2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
392.090(2) (West 1999); MO. ANN. STAT. § 474.140 (West Supp. 2005); N.Y. EST. 
POWERS & TRUSTS §5-1.2(a) (Consol. 1979 & Supp. 2005); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 
2106(a) (West Supp. 2005). 
 116 See generally Brown, supra note 98, at 569–78; Anna-Marie E. Rhodes, Abandon-
ing Parents Under Intestacy: Where We Are, Where We Need to Go, 27 IND. L. REV. 517 
(1994); Tracy B. Harding, Note, Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights: Reform Is 
Needed, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 895 (2001). 
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this area, the UPC, endorses a broad authority of courts to preclude 
parental inheritance.117  The UPC has and continues to influence de-
velopment of this area of the law.  In fact, UPC in its recent promul-
gation has expanded the applicability of its “bad parent” provisions to 
include even more instances of conduct meriting disinheritance.118
Unfortunately, the evidence generated from empirical studies in 
this context is limited.  No study inquires as to the preferences of 
children when parents commit various crimes or bad acts against 
them.  Although it seems natural to assume that the presumed will 
theory has emerged because “[r]arely would distribution to an unre-
sponsive[, abandoning, or abusive] father approximate the intent of 
an illegitimate child,”119 other evidence suggests the duty theory is 
operational here because “children continue to love and bond with 
parents who have badly abused and/or abandoned them.”120
Although it appears uncertain which theory is endorsed by “bad 
parent” statutes, further examination suggests the duty theory has 
prevailed.  Consider the “bad parent” situation in reverse.  If a “bad 
parent” rather than the abandoned child is to die first, it is at least a 
plausible assumption that the parent who abandoned or at least re-
fused to acknowledge the child would not want his child to inherit 
from him after death.121  In other words, the “presumed will” of such 
a “bad parent” is likely not to favor the child he abandoned.  Despite 
this plausible assumption, the law does not disinherit the child in 
these circumstances, even though a parent could do so by means of a 
testament.  Instead, the child is allowed to inherit from his parent, as 
any other child would.  The point of this observation is not to suggest 
that the child should be disinherited, but that the disinheritance of 
the parent is imposed as a penalty for violation of the parent’s duty, 
not in an attempt to track the presumed will of the deceased child. 
 
 117 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5 
(1999); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114 (1990). 
 118 Compare UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114 (1990), with, UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-109 
(1969).  See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 
2.5. 
 119 Julian R. Kossow, The New York Law of Intestate Succession Compared with the Uni-
form Probate Code: When There’s No Will There’s No Way, in COMPARATIVE PROBATE LAW 
STUDIES 55, 85 (1976). 
 120 Paula A. Monopoli, “Deadbeat Dads”: Should Support and Inheritance Be Linked?, 
49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 257, 277 (1994). 
 121 Hirsch, supra note 3, at 1086 (“When an abandoning parent is the first to die, 
his or her abandoned child can inherit as an intestate heir . . . .  Yet, even more di-
rectly, [one] could infer from the parent’s lifetime decision a preference not to pro-
vide for the child at death either.”). 
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III.     ASSESSMENT 
A. Problems with the Duty Theory 
The preceding discussion has demonstrated that the dominant 
trend in parental intestacy rights is motivated, or at least influenced 
strongly by, the “duty theory” rather than the “presumed will” theory.  
This conclusion is problematic because both theories are not equally 
acceptable in the context of intestacy.  To see why this is the case, the 
concept of a “duty” must be clearly defined.  As it has been used in 
the preceding discussion, the term “duty” is imprecise and somewhat 
inaccurate.  Although more accurate variants of the duty theory exist, 
they too are problematic.  The presumed will theory serves as a better 
model for intestacy law.  This conclusion, as will be shown, addresses 
the practical and pragmatic needs of a modern society and does not 
portend a weakening of the parent/child relationship. 
1. Defining a Duty 
The concept of a duty seems intuitively clear.  To say that one 
has a duty to another is to say that there is an obligation owed from 
one party to another.  The concept of a duty is used frequently in the 
criminal law context.  To say that one has a legal duty not to kill oth-
ers means that if one does kill, legal penalties or punishments attach 
to such conduct.  In the words of H.L.A. Hart: 
If we disobey [the criminal law] we are said to “break” the law and 
what we have done is legally “wrong,” a “breach of duty,” or an 
“offence.”  The social function which a criminal statute performs 
is that of setting up and defining certain kinds of conduct as 
something to be avoided or done by those to whom it applies, irre-
spective of their wishes.122
Outside the criminal context, the concept of the law imposing 
duties is not foreign to the civil or private law.123  The term “breach of 
duty” is frequently used in tort law, where it indicates that conduct 
has violated a legal norm and that compensation must be paid to an-
other for damage.  The important similarity between these duties of 
criminal law and the duties of the private law is that the “duty,” 
whether it be not to kill or not to damage another’s property, applies 
irrespective of the wishes of the person who owes the duty.  That is, 
the criminal or the tortfeasor owes a duty not to injure or interfere 
 122 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 27 (2d ed. 1994) (emphasis added). 
 123 Note that the distinction employed in this instance is between civil and crimi-
nal law (or private and public law), not that between civil and common law. 
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with others even if he does not want to owe that duty.  He cannot 
avoid the duty, at least not unilaterally. 
In the family law context, a parent owes a duty to a minor child.  
While the parent is alive, the parent owes a legally enforceable duty 
of support, care, and maintenance to a minor child.  The rise of legis-
lation punishing “deadbeat dads” evidences the enforceability of this 
duty, which is not severable by divorce.  The duty exists even if the so-
called deadbeat dad does not want to support his child.124  He cannot 
unilaterally evade his duty. 
In fact, in civil law countries and in Louisiana, the obligation is 
not even severable by death.  Civil law systems have a concept of 
“forced heirship,” which provides a guaranteed or a forced share of a 
parent’s estate to a child.  This obligation is legally enforceable by the 
child and enforceable whether a parent dies intestate or dies with a 
will that provides to the contrary.  If a parent dies with a will exclud-
ing his child and leaving his entire estate to his second or third 
spouse, the child has rights against the parent’s estate for payment of 
his “forced share.”  Absent “just cause,” the parent cannot unilaterally 
disinherit the child merely by making a will.125
Similarly, all non-community property states provide that 
spouses have duties toward each other, even after death. 126  For in-
stance, even if all the assets of the marriage are titled in the name of 
one spouse, that spouse cannot effectively disinherit his surviving 
spouse by leaving his entire estate to his secret lover, a needy parent, 
a sibling, or a charity.  In such cases, the surviving spouse can “elect” 
against the will and receive a designated share or fraction of the de-
ceased spouse’s estate, the provisions of the will notwithstanding to 
the contrary.  The deceased spouse cannot unilaterally avoid his 
“duty” of support owed to his surviving spouse.127
 
 124 For discussion of the connection between parental misconduct and inheri-
tance, see Monopoli, supra note 120, at 277. 
 125 See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1617 (2000 & 2006 Supp.). 
 126 Georgia is the only non-community property state without an elective-share 
statute.  See JESSE DUKEMINIER, STANLEY M. JOHANSON, JAMES LINDGREN & ROBERT H. 
SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 425 n.1 (7th ed. 2005).  Georgia does, however, 
grant a surviving spouse and children a right of support and maintenance for one 
year after the deceased spouse’s death.  See GA. CODE ANN. § 53-3-1 to -5 (1996 & 
Supp. 2005). 
 127 Two points of clarification are in order.  First, although the forced or elective 
share right of a surviving spouse is frequently thought of as a property right based 
upon a spouse’s contribution to the marriage, this is not the only rationale behind 
the elective share.  “Another theoretical basis for elective-share law is that the 
spouses’ mutual duties of support during their joint lifetimes should be continued in 
some form after death in favor of the survivor, as a claim on the decedent’s estate.”  
SCALISEFINAL.DOC 10/20/2006  11:41:33 AM 
2006] HONOR THY FATHER AND MOTHER? 197 
 
These are true legal duties.  In each of the cases described 
above, i.e., when a child dies survived by (1) a spouse and parents; (2) 
siblings and parents; and (3) “bad” parents, something is missing.  In 
those cases, the “duty” owed can be lifted by the unilateral act of the 
party on whom it is imposed.  In the first two cases, the obligation 
that the child has to his parents exists only in intestacy and can be 
avoided by the unilateral act of the child in making a will leaving any, 
all, or none of his estate to his parents without sanction or reprisal by 
the law.  The child can totally exclude the parents in favor of his sur-
viving spouse, siblings, or even his childhood pet.128  In such a sce-
nario, the parents would have no relief or recourse against the child’s 
estate under the law of wills. 
The third case, involving “bad parents,” is slightly different be-
cause the issue there concerns the absence of a child’s duty toward 
his parent in intestacy by virtue of the parent’s conduct rather than 
the existence of a duty.  Even in this case, however, the duty of the 
child, i.e., repayment or gratitude, prior to the parent’s bad act is still 
the same.  This is evident by the non-application of these “bad par-
ent” statutes due to the mere unilateral act by the child of executing a 
will.  For example, if a child makes a will leaving his estate to a parent 
who later commits a defined “bad act,” the “bad parent” statute does 
not apply.  These statutes do not operate like “slayer statutes,”129 
which preclude a killer from receiving property by a will, intestacy, or 
a nonprobate transfer device.  The “bad parent” statutes apply only in 
intestacy; any duty that might be owed from a child to his parent is 
relieved once a will is executed. 
In summation, the “duty” theory appears, at a minimum, to be a 
misnomer.  Although these statues are clearly motivated by what soci-
ety perceives to be the obligations or duties that children have to re-
pay parents for their time, effort, and money in supporting, raising, 
and educating them, the term “legal duty” is not accurate. 
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE Pt. 2 Gen. Cmt. (1990).  Secondly, although a deceased 
spouse cannot unilaterally avoid his duty to his surviving spouse, a surviving spouse 
can unilaterally absolve the decedent spouse from his duty by executing a binding 
waiver of elective-share rights.  This observation does not affect the classification of 
the above situation as one involving a true legal duty.  Tort victims may similarly re-
lieve tortfeasors of their duties through consent.  The general maxim of volenti non fit 
iniuria applies. 
 128 For a discussion of the use and rise of pet trust legislation in American states, 
see Robert E. Blizard, Roger A. Kindler, Murdaugh S. Madden & Nancy Peterson, 
Helping Clients Provide for Pets in Their Estate Plans, 18 PROB. & PROP. 52 (2004). 
 129 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & 
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.4 (2003). 
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2. Variants of the Duty Theory 
a. Moral or Social Duties 
Perhaps, then, the imposition of these rules of intestacy is not in 
fulfillment of legal duties, but merely in satisfaction of moral or social 
ones.  In other words, legal duties may exist in the context of criminal 
law and tort law, but intestacy law seeks not to enforce legal duties, 
but merely to encourage the performance of moral or social ones.  
To illustrate, perhaps there exists a moral or social duty to contribute 
to charity or to aid the impoverished.  The law does not mandate 
contributions to the Red Cross as a legal duty, but merely encourages 
fulfillment of moral or social duties to do so.  The law performs this 
function by allowing deductions for contributions from personal in-
come tax.130  By so doing, the law provides an incentive to contribute 
to charity and to fulfill social or moral duties.  Correspondingly, the 
law penalizes those who fail to give by increasing, in relative terms, 
the tax burden on those who do not contribute to charities. 
The law may also seek to encourage social or moral obligations 
inherent in relationships between certain family members, such as 
spouses.  The law may perform such a function by establishing sup-
pletive rules that apply unless individuals affirmatively opt out of a 
system.  In so doing, the law encourages observance of the suppletive 
or default rules by making adherence to them economically and so-
cially cheaper.  To avoid the default rules, transaction costs must be 
incurred. 
Take, for example, community property laws.  Community prop-
erty laws, among other things, encourage the performance of a 
spouse’s social duty to protect financially his surviving spouse after he 
dies by allowing a surviving spouse to claim a fraction of property ac-
quired during the marriage.131  Although the law allows avoidance of 
this social duty by electing out of the community property regime, 
the law does encourage the performance of the social duty to care 
and provide for a surviving spouse.132  This encouragement takes the 
 130 26 U.S.C.S. § 170 (LexisNexis 2006). 
 131 This is not the exclusive rationale for community property laws. See supra note 
127. 
 132 See WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR. & CYNTHIA A. SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE 
UNITED STATES 33 (6th ed. 2004).  See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-202 (1991); CAL. 
FAM. CODE § 1500 (West 1994); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-906 (1980); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. 
art. 2329 (1980); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.070 (1873); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3A-1 to -10 
(West 1995); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.202 (Vernon 2000); WASH. REV. CODE § 
26.16.120 (1998); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.58 (West 1983).  But see ALASKA REV. STAT. § 
34.77.030 (1998).  Unlike other community property states, the default regime in 
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form not of a tax credit but of decreased transaction costs.  That is, a 
community property regime, along with its ancillary spousal protec-
tion, exists by virtue of marriage, without need for further documen-
tation or legal proceedings.  Those electing to avoid their social du-
ties must incur the increased transaction costs involved in varying 
from the default rule and in choosing a separate property regime. 
Similarly, the rules of intestacy set up default rules.133  Important 
rules in American intestacy law include a parent’s right to share in a 
child’s estate along with the child’s surviving spouse, a parent’s right 
to inherit to the exclusion of a deceased child’s siblings, and preclu-
sion from inheritance by “bad parents.”  All of these rules seek to en-
courage fulfillment of social duties of repayment and gratitude that 
children owe to parents.  Those seeking to avoid the default rules 
must incur the additional expense of drafting a will.  Thus, society, by 
virtue of the content of the chosen intestacy rules, promotes certain 
social or moral duties. 
b. The Expressive Theory 
A different but related way of looking at this situation is in terms 
of the “expressive function” of the law.  Law provides rules for allow-
able and unallowable conduct and expresses a societal view or policy 
that a particular regime, relationship, or status is favored or disfa-
vored.  For example, by including children as the first class of recipi-
ents in an intestacy scheme, society expresses its view that children 
are important and should be cared for by parents—even after a par-
ent’s death.  Similarly, the existence of a community property regime 
expresses approval of a certain economic partnership view of mar-
riage.  It does so by creating laws that treat property acquired during 
marriage as property equally owned by both spouses.  The law does 
not require or mandate this type of arrangement, but instead seeks 
merely to encourage it.  If individuals, for whatever reasons, seek to 
create a different marital property regime, they are free to do so by 
specifically so electing.  By establishing this regime, however, society 
communicates its view that marriage is most properly viewed as an 
economic partnership and that the subjugation of one spouse to the 
other is, while not prohibited, at least not a favored status. 
Similarly, by refusing to acknowledge homosexual marriage or 
civil unions in the laws of intestacy, society has implicitly condemned 
such a social arrangement, expressed its disapproval, and sought to 
Alaska is a separate property one and individuals must affirmatively elect into a 
community property regime if they so desire.  See id. 
 133 See Hirsch, supra note 3, at 1033–1061. 
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dissuade citizens from entering such arrangements.134  In the words of 
E. Gary Spitko: 
     It is a truism that the law teaches as it governs.  The law has 
great potential to teach and reinforce the values that ground it or 
appear to ground it.  Those who experience the law operating on 
them personally and those who observe the law operating on oth-
ers are likely to learn whom the law respects, ignores, privileges, 
and disadvantages. 
     In this way, intestacy law not only reflects society’s familial 
norms but also helps to shape and maintain them.  Thus, succes-
sion law reform has great potential to change the way our society 
views gay men and lesbians and, indeed, how gay men and lesbi-
ans view themselves.135
A significant number of scholars have recently adopted this “ex-
pressive” theory of intestacy law.136  Although similar to the “social” or 
“moral” duty theory, the expressive theory is less harsh.  Under the 
expressive theory, society need not label an individual as immoral or 
antisocial in choosing not to follow a particular default provision of 
the law.  Instead, under the expressive theory, society merely attempts 
to teach individuals how their fellow citizens view particular relation-
ships, statuses, or regimes. 
3. Problems with the Variants 
Although the duty theory ought to be more accurately renamed 
the “social duty” theory or recast as the “expressive” theory of law, 
these variants of the duty theory are likewise problematic.  This is so 
because of the ineffectiveness of the chosen route of communication 
and the disproportionate impact such expressions have on those of a 
lower socio-economic class.  To fully understand this critique, two is-
sues must be examined: (1) who dies intestate and (2) how well indi-
viduals know and understand the rules of intestacy that embody so-
cietal values or expressions. 
 134 See generally RALPH C. BRASHIER, INHERITANCE LAW AND THE EVOLVING FAMILY 40–
89 (2004); T.P. Gallanis, Inheritance Rights for Domestic Partners, 79 TUL. L. REV. 55 
(2004) (discussing the variety of approaches taken by states on inheritance by domes-
tic partners); Ronald J. Scalise Jr., New Developments in United States Succession Law, 54 
AM. J. COMP. L. 103, 103–08 (2006).  For a discussion of the issues involved in estate 
planning for same-sex or other unmarried couples, see Wendy S. Goffe, Estate Plan-
ning for the Unmarried Couple/Non-Traditional Family, 31 ACTEC J. 177, 177–207 
(2005). 
 135 Spitko, supra note 12, at 1100–01. 
 136 See, e.g., id. at 1100; Mary Louise Fellows, Monica Kirkpatrick Johnson, Amy 
Chiericozzi, Ann Hale, Christopher Lee, Robin Preble & Michael Voran, Committed 
Partners and Inheritance: An Empirical Study, 16 LAW & INEQ. 1, 8 (1998). 
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a. Who Dies Intestate? 
The exact frequency of intestacy in the United States is not spe-
cifically known.  A number of studies suggest that the majority of the 
population dies intestate.137  Within this large group, however, further 
patterns can be detected.  That is, some demographic segments of 
the population are much more likely to die intestate than others.  
Among the factors contributing positively to the likelihood of intes-
tacy are low income, low occupational status, and low educational 
level. 
Wealth tends to be a significant characteristic among testators.  
The variety of studies that have examined the correlation between 
wealth and testacy have done so in different ways.  However, all seem 
to agree that increased wealth tends to correspond with an increased 
rate of testacy.  Studies that have examined family income have uni-
formly found that those most likely to have a will are those at the top 
end of the scale and those least likely to have a will are at the bottom 
end of the income scale.138  Correspondingly, those with estates at the 
bottom end of the scale are least likely to die testate, while those with 
estates at the top end of the scale are most likely to die testate.139  In 
short, “[t]he greater the accumulation of wealth, the less likely that 
individuals will die intestate.”140
 137 See supra note 1.  But see WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 1, at 35 (“Of course, even 
for those people who die intestate, intestacy is often not the prevailing form of family 
property transfer.  Many decedents will die having provided for the disposition of at 
least some of their property through a will substitute, such as a joint tenancy with 
right of survivorship or a life insurance contract.”).  See also John H. Langbein, The 
Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 
1108–1141 (1984); Robert A. Stein & Ian G. Fierstein, The Demography of Probate Ad-
ministration, 15 U. BALT. L. REV. 54, 102–04 (1985). 
 138 Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 1, at 338 (finding only 38.8% of those with 
family income of less than $8000 have a will, while 65.4% of those with family income 
of $25,000 or more have a will). 
 139 Id. at 338 (finding only 14.7% of those with estate size between $0 and $12,999 
have a will, while 69.0% of those with an estate between $100,000 and $500,000 have 
a will); SUSSMAN, CATES & SMITH, supra note 1, at 73 (finding the average net estate 
for testate decedents to be $35,160 and the average net estate for intestate decedents 
to be $6694); Ward & Beuscher, supra note 1, at 412 (finding only 35.6% of those 
with estates up to $5000 have wills, while 92.3% of those with estates over $50,000 
have a will). 
 140 INHERITANCE AND WEALTH IN AMERICA 201 (Robert K. Miller, Jr. & Stephen J. 
McNamee eds., 1998). 
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Occupation also corresponds with the frequency of testation,141 
with white-collar workers being significantly more likely to have wills 
than blue-collar workers.142  Other studies have classified workers dif-
ferently, but have predictably found that groups such as “proprietors” 
more frequently have wills, while craftsmen, sales workers, and cleri-
cals have a much lower testacy rate.143  Still other studies have found 
that “Major Professionals and Top Executives” were most likely to die 
testate, while those with jobs characterized as “Unskilled Manual La-
bor” are least likely to die testate.144  In short, testacy tends to be “as-
sociated with high occupational status.”145
Even aside from wealth and occupation, high levels of educa-
tional attainment correspond with high rates of testacy.146  While few 
studies have investigated the significance of this variable on the pro-
pensity of testation, one study examining this issue observed that the 
tendency to die with a will directly increased with educational level.  
Thus, those with less than a high school diploma are most likely to 
die intestate, and those with an advanced degree are least likely to die 
intestate.147  In between these two extremes, the relation generally 
continues to be a direct one, with those having a “bachelor’s degree” 
being more likely to have a will than those with “some college but less 
than a bachelor’s degree.”148  Although there is a possibility that edu-
cation and occupation track the same variable with respect to testacy, 
studies that have examined both variables have found that high edu-
cational attainment operates independently of occupation, and when 
 
 141 Thomas J. Mulder, Intestate Succession Under the Uniform Probate Code, 3 
PROSPECTUS 301, 309 (1970); REMI CLIGNET, DEATH, DEEDS, AND DESCENDANTS: 
INHERITANCE IN MODERN AMERICA 130 (1992).  But see Ward & Beuscher, supra note 1, 
at 412 (concluding that “[t]here did not appear to be any significant occupational 
difference with respect to use of a will”). 
 142 Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 1, at 338 (finding only 30.4% of blue-collar 
workers have a will, while 45.4% of white-collar workers have a will); Glucksman, su-
pra note 12, at 258 n.15 (finding 24% of white-collar respondents were intestate, 
while 35% of blue-collar ones had no will). 
 143 Dunham, supra note 1, at 248. 
 144 SUSSMAN, CATES & SMITH, supra note 1, at 77, Table 4-15. 
 145 Id. at 82. 
 146 ALICE S. ROSSI & PETER H. ROSSI, OF HUMAN BONDING: PARENT-CHILD RELATIONS 
ACROSS THE LIFE COURSE 473 (1990) (“The predictions concerning income and edu-
cation are also confirmed, with written wills more prevalent among those with higher 
educational attainment and higher income . . . .”). 
 147 Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 1, at 338 (reporting 63.3% of those with “less 
than a high school diploma” do not have a will, while only 40% of those with an “ad-
vanced degree” have no will). 
 148 Id. (reporting 57.2% of those with “college less than a bachelor’s degree” do 
not have a will, while only 46.7% of those with a “bachelor’s degree” have no will). 
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the two are combined, that group demonstrates the highest levels of 
testacy.149
In conclusion, those with wills tend to be wealthy, well-educated, 
white-collar workers, while those without wills tend to be less finan-
cially secure, have less formal education, and perform less lucrative 
jobs.  This fact, by itself, is rather unremarkable and expected.  The 
implications of this obvious demographic trend, however, merit con-
sideration.  Intestacy laws affect and influence more of those in the 
latter group than in the former.  Although the latter class may have 
fewer absolute assets to distribute at death, the relative importance of 
those assets to the decedent and his heirs is no less meaningful. 
b. Effectiveness of “Expression” 
The second main problem facing the “social duty” or “expres-
sive” theory of intestacy is that studies have shown that intestacy law is 
a very poor way to promote or express social duties.  Irrespective of 
the content of the message that the law seeks to express, the mode of 
expression is particularly ineffective.  In a study conducted by Fellows, 
Simon and Rau, participants were asked the following question: 
“If you died today without a will, do you know who would inherit your 
property?”150
Over 70% of respondents indicated that they did in fact know to 
whom their property would be distributed in intestacy, but when 
pressed further as to how the property would be distributed, only 
44.6% responded “correctly or nearly so.”151  In an Illinois study, a 
similar question was asked; again, seventy percent of respondents 
claimed they knew to whom their property would devolve in intestacy, 
but an overwhelming sixty-four percent of them were wrong.152  Fi-
nally and most astonishingly, a survey of residents of Morris County, 
New Jersey, revealed that “[f]ourteen percent of the sample did not 
know that intestate inheritance exists” and believed that if an individ-
ual died intestate the government received a decedent’s property.153  
Thus, under all studies, the average respondent demonstrates an ab-
sence of understanding of the laws of intestacy. 
It is not difficult to see why this is the case.  A number of factors 
are influential.  First, the rules of intestacy are complex.  Even the 
Roman intestacy laws, which governed a society much less complex 
 149 SUSSMAN, CATES & SMITH, supra note 1, at 80–81. 
 150 Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 1, at 339. 
 151 Id. at 340. 
 152 See Fellows, Simon, Snapp & Snapp, supra note 1, at 723. 
 153 Glucksman, supra note 12, at 263. 
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than our own, have been described as “a mass of detail, throwing little 
light on other parts of the law.”154  For a modern example, consider 
the elective share rights of the surviving spouse under the current 
UPC.  To properly ascertain a spouse’s right in intestacy involves the 
calculation of an augmented estate with the inclusion of certain non-
probate transfers and the subsequent application of a fractional share 
whose value fluctuates based upon the length of the marriage.155  In 
fact, Lawrence Waggoner, the principal drafter of the UPC’s elective 
share system, has recently proposed a new and simpler method of 
calculation, in part as an effort to “add transparency and clarity to the 
system.”156
The intestacy rules of parental inheritance are likewise complex.  
That is, in those states in which the surviving spouse does not exclude 
parents, the law awards a fraction of the estate, usually one-fourth or 
one-third, only after the dispersal to the surviving spouse of a fixed 
dollar amount, usually $50,000 or $200,000.  Such a system, although 
designed to award the majority of a small estate to a surviving spouse, 
lacks the kind of clarity and intuitive transparency necessary to com-
municate effectively to the lay populace.157
In addition to the complexity of intestacy laws, the brief tempo-
ral effectiveness of the laws has also served to obscure the societal 
message.  In other words, the expression of the law is jumbled by the 
frequent amendment and change to the rules of parental inheri-
tance.  As seen above, the UPC has served as one of the most influen-
tial causes of reform in modern intestacy law.  Its two major promul-
gations, one in 1969 and the other in 1990, contain a number of 
important differences.158  As a result, a number of states have under-
gone major revision within the time frame of one generation.  Al-
though the revision was a laudable one, it significantly altered intes-
tacy law in such a way that it risks running afoul of Aristotle’s warning 
that “the easy alteration of existing laws in favor of new and different 
 154 W.W. BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 365 
(Peter Stein rev., 3d ed. 1963) (1921). 
 155 UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-202 to 2-205 (1990). 
 156 Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Probate Code’s Elective Share: Time for a Reas-
sessment, 37 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 1, 32 (2003). 
 157 See generally Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual 
Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 1, 1–17 (1993) (discussing the danger of overly com-
plex default rules); George S. Geis, An Experiment in the Optimal Precision of Contract 
Default Rules, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1109, 1124–29 (2006). 
 158 UNIF. PROBATE CODE, Prefatory Note, Article II Revisions (“In 1990, Article II of 
the Code underwent significant revisions.”). 
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ones weakens the power of law itself.”159  Here, the alterations have 
significantly changed the content of the expressions or social duties 
conveyed less than thirty years ago.  Thus, the lessons likely learned 
from the death of older relatives may have substantially changed from 
the lessons being communicated by the laws of intestacy today. 
Similarly, the rules of intestacy among states are diverse, again 
partly as a result of the differing sections and differing versions of the 
UPC being enacted at a variety of times in a variety of states.  In each 
of the topics examined in this Paper, multiple approaches exist.  In 
inheritance situations involving both parents and a surviving spouse, 
at least four major approaches exist with a host of minor differences 
embedded within those major themes.  In instances where parents 
and siblings survive, at least two variants exist in the United States.  
Finally, in “bad parent” situations, there are countless variations in 
state laws, which have been grouped into three large classes of cases 
pertaining to parental acknowledgment and support, parental con-
duct directed against a child, and parental conduct against a spouse.  
Thus, even if one were to have sufficiently learned the intestacy re-
gime of a given state and not to have been faced with significant al-
teration, the increased mobility of citizens in today’s society is likely 
to frustrate any lessons previously learned.  One may very well have 
learned the law of one state only to move because of a job, to be close 
to children, or for a preferable climate and thus be faced with differ-
ent rules of intestacy in a new state of residence.  “[T]here is no uni-
formity between the laws of most of the fifty states.  This fact may 
cause not only unjust results but also an inherent confusion and dis-
trust among a very mobile lay populace.”160
Furthermore, there appears to be no unifying theme to intestacy 
law against which the layman can apply a very basic knowledge in one 
area of intestacy to other factual situations.  Some rules are unquali-
fiedly based on the presumed intent of the decedent (e.g., inheri-
tance by one’s surviving spouse rather than one’s children), while 
others rely upon the duty theory (e.g., the surviving spouse’s elective-
share rights), and still others on the expressive purpose of the law 
(e.g., parental inheritance rights).  In the words of Professor Averill: 
     Tracking policies in probate laws, even the 1990 UPC, may be 
similar to tracking court decisions concerning rules of will con-
struction.  It may be difficult to distinguish between what is a per-
vasive objective policy and a mere subjective result.  Even among 
 159 ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 73 (Carnes Lord, trans., 1984). 
 160 Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., An Eclectic History and Analysis of the 1990 Uniform Pro-
bate Code, 55 ALB. L. REV. 891, 895 (1991). 
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ascertainable and accepted policies there are overlaps, conflicts, 
and inconsistencies.161
Finally, inquiry must be made as to the exact way in which the 
laws of intestacy purport to teach societal expressions and values.  
One scholar has noted that “[t]hose who experience the law operat-
ing on them personally and those who observe the law operating on 
others are likely to learn whom the law respects, ignores, privileges, 
and disadvantages.”162  For obvious reasons, it is rather difficult to ob-
serve the rules of intestacy operating on oneself.  Intestacy rules are 
not like contract rules or even family law rules.  Once one is in a posi-
tion to see personally the rules’ application, it is, alas, too late to learn 
anything. 
The intestacy laws, however, may be observed in operation on 
others.  In such a case, those learning from or being encouraged by 
the rules will be the recipients of a decedent’s property, rather than 
the decedent himself.  In other words, by receiving property as an in-
testate heir, an individual learns which familial relations are favored 
in society and which are not.  Be that as it may, the application of in-
testacy rules on others has in practice provided little pedagogical 
value—at least as to the respondents in the above studies of whom 
nearly two-thirds not only failed to learn the lesson or expression that 
society wanted to teach, but even worse, by their misunderstanding of 
the law presumably learned a lesson society had no intention of 
teaching at all. 
In short, any system that seeks to enforce moral or social duties 
through the laws of intestacy or that attempts to express society’s view 
that some relations or statuses are favored and others disfavored is 
inherently flawed.  It is flawed by virtue of its disparate impact and 
disproportional imposition on the poorer, lower educated, under-
employed part of the populace, while leaving its message or its mores 
not only unheard by but also unvoiced to the more affluent, well-
educated, and professional class.  Such a message is at best paternalis-
tic and at worst discriminatory.  At a minimum it violates the basic 
idea of justice as fairness.163  Even if an argument for the paternalistic 
treatment of the lower educated and underemployed could be made, 
 161 Id. at 911. 
 162 Spitko, supra note 12, at 1100. 
 163 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 108–14 (1971).  By reference here to 
Rawls’s work, this Paper does not attempt to endorse or reject the details of Rawls’s 
philosophy or even to suggest their applicability in the context of intestacy law—a 
topic well-beyond the scope of this Paper.  Here, the only purpose is to borrow his 
characterization and assertion that for justice to be done some level of fairness be-
tween and among the parties involved must be accorded. 
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the success in communicating this message through the laws of intes-
tacy is, again, either at best ineffective or at worst counterproductive, 
given that most of those who claim to understand intestate distribu-
tion actually misunderstand it. 
4. Societal Implications 
In light of the above, an initial reaction may be one of great dis-
tress over the state of a society in which children appear to feel no 
sense of obligation or concern for their parents.  If the duty theory 
motivates most laws in this context and the majoritarian preference is 
contrary to such duties, concern may exist about the repercussions of 
such an observation.  The implications are not, however, as startling 
as one might think. 
Sociological evidence demonstrates that the bond children have 
with their parents is one of the strongest bonds in human relations.  
In a factorial study conducted by Rossi and Rossi in 1984 and 1985, 
individuals responded to a random sampling of 32 from a possible 
1600 vignettes to ascertain the existence and strength of a particular 
obligation felt by an individual for his kin.164  The vignettes varied 
from those testing obligations in a “crisis” event, such as an unmar-
ried sister undergoing a major surgery, to those assessing a “celebra-
tory” event, such as a widowed father having a birthday.165  For each 
vignette, respondents were asked to gauge, on a scale of zero to ten, 
with zero begin no obligation and ten being a “very strong obliga-
tion,” the significance of an obligation, if any, felt toward the individ-
ual in the given circumstance.166  The test further inquired as to the 
types of obligations felt, such as the duty to supply “comfort” in a cri-
sis as opposed to “money,” and an inclination to provide a “gift” for a 
celebratory event as opposed to a “visit.”167
Interestingly enough, of all the kinship relationships examined, 
one’s “own parents” tested, in all situations, either first or second in 
the degree of obligation felt, even sometimes before one’s own chil-
dren, as in the situation of providing comfort in a crisis event.168  
More relevant for inheritance purposes, though, is the degree of ob-
ligation felt by children for their parents to provide money in a time 
of crisis or a gift for a celebratory event.  In both cases, parents either 
 164 ROSSI & ROSSI, supra note 146, at 155–209. 
 165 Id. at 162. 
 166 Id. at 167. 
 167 See id. at 168. 
 168 It is important to note that one’s spouse was not one of the relations included 
in this survey. 
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tied for first with children in the crisis situation or placed second in 
relation to children in the celebratory gift situation.  In all cases, the 
mean rating of the obligation that children feel toward parents ex-
ceeds eight on a  ten-point scale, indicating respondents feel a 
“strong” to “very strong” sense of obligation.169
These results seem surprising.  When compared with the disposi-
tive preferences examined earlier, the Rossi and Rossi data on emo-
tional affinity seems, at first glance, to be contradictory.  That is, if the 
degree of emotional affinity and the sense of obligation are often 
highest with respect to one’s parents, one would expect to find par-
ents at or near the top of the list of intended beneficiaries in intes-
tacy.  As has been shown, such is not the case.  In attempting to ex-
plain the dispositive preferences of individuals against this backdrop, 
a number of theories present sensible and practical reasons why a 
child’s dispositive preference diverges from the strong emotional ties 
he has to his parents. 
First and perhaps most obviously, individuals may choose to 
leave their estates to their spouses or siblings rather than their par-
ents for purely financial reasons.  Quite simply, spouses and siblings 
ordinarily have more of a need for financial support than parents.  As 
a demographic group, those sixty-five and older are one of the most 
affluent age groups in American society.170  Siblings and spouses, of-
ten those between the ages of thirty and fifty, however, are frequently 
financially strained with educational costs of children, home mort-
gages, and countless other expenditures.  Oftentimes, the financial 
goals of those sixty-five and older are to dissipate their estates in or-
der to avoid taxation and costly administration procedures.  It makes 
little sense to augment through inheritance the estates of the very in-
dividuals who are otherwise attempting to diminish their assets. 
Secondly, upon death, children may wish to favor younger gen-
erations rather than older generations to avoid the rapid imposition 
of double taxation.  Although it is true that the Applicable Credit 
Amount171 provides a sufficient exemption from estate taxes for all 
but the most wealthy of decedents—a group that is rather unlikely to 
die intestate—state estate taxes may become applicable at lower levels 
 169 ROSSI & ROSSI, supra note 146, at 173. 
 170 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NET WORTH AND ASSET OWNERSHIP: 1998 AND 2000 9–12 
(May 2003) (reporting that “[t]he age of a householder has a positive relationship 
with household net worth up to age 74” and finding that only those between the ages 
of 55 and 64 have a higher median net worth than those over 65 years of age). 
 171 The “Applicable Credit Amount” is a tax credit that exempts estates of a speci-
fied size from federal estate taxes.  See 26 U.S.C. § 2010 (2000). 
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as may state and federal income taxes payable by all those who re-
ceive inheritances.  The prospect of leaving an inheritance to a par-
ent who dies shortly after the decedent and then transmits the very 
same property to the siblings of the original decedent seems to invite 
double taxation within a short period of time—something individuals 
are apt to avoid. 
Thirdly, those who desire their siblings to receive their estates 
rather than their parents likely do so not out of malevolence felt to-
ward their parents but rather under the “conduit theory” of inheri-
tance.  Under the conduit theory, individuals receive legacies not 
only for their own benefit but also for purposes of channeling those 
assets to other favored groups.172  The most common example of this 
conduit theory is the share of the estate left to the surviving spouse, if 
the decedent is survived by both descendants and his surviving spouse 
who is also the parent of the descendants.173  When this is the case, 
the surviving spouse receives the entire estate, not because a parent 
wishes to abandon his children but, instead, because a parent wishes 
to provide both for his surviving spouse and his children and because 
the parent knows that his surviving spouse will do so and at death 
transmit the property to the children. 
As in the situation in which a decedent leaves the entire estate to 
his surviving spouse to enjoy and to provide for the children, dece-
dents might also leave inheritances to their siblings to enjoy and pro-
vide for their ailing, elderly parents.  Anecdotal evidence uncovered 
by Sussman, Cates, and Smith in their study on inheritance bolsters 
the idea that this rationale motivates at least some decedents.174  In 
examining two estates in which decedents favored siblings over par-
ents in wills, the authors found that “[t]he reasons for disinheriting 
parents in these circumstances were not based on malicious fore-
thought.  Rather, this pattern of distribution was chosen because the 
care and protection of the parents was uppermost in the minds of the 
testators.”175  Even in cases of financial need by parents, a dispositive 
preference for a sibling or spouse who may have a similar financial 
need is sensible.  Those sixty-five and older have access to social wel-
fare and safety-net programs (e.g., Social Security) that younger gen-
erations do not.  Although older generations have higher medical 
costs than younger ones, programs such as Medicare help to offset 
some of those costs.  Other costs for ailing elderly parents are fre-
 172 Spitko, supra note 12, at 1078. 
 173 Id. 
 174 See SUSSMAN, CATES & SMITH, supra note 1, at 95–96. 
 175 Id. 
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quently borne by family members, thus giving rise to the term the 
“Sandwich Generation,” in reference to those individuals sandwiched 
between caring for their own children and their parents.176  Even if a 
decedent’s parents are financially needy, it is a sensible disposition in 
many cases to prefer one’s siblings over one’s parents in the knowl-
edge that the siblings will care for ailing parents with the inheritance. 
Fourthly, decedents may also have their dispositive preferences 
affected by their parents’ behavior, specifically their parents’ deci-
sions regarding remarriage.  Incidences of remarriage, even in old 
age, are not uncommon.  Recent estimates are that half a million 
people in the United States over the age of sixty-five remarry each 
year.177  Sociological studies have demonstrated that adult children 
feel less of an obligation to stepparents than to their own parents.178  
The diminished character of this obligation is perhaps due to lack of 
a close relationship during a child’s formative years, a minimum 
amount of time spent together, or even a fear of the loss on a child’s 
inheritance.179  Whatever the rationale, a diminished sense of obliga-
tion—emotional, financial, and otherwise—is clear in the case of 
stepparents.180  The dispositive preferences of decedents toward their 
own parents may reflect recognition of this fact.  That is, a decedent 
may be concerned with a stepparent receiving the property left to a 
blood parent after a blood parent dies, thus precluding a sibling of 
the original decedent from ever receiving anything.  In short, a 
child’s dispositive preference toward his parent at death may be af-
 176 Heather M. Fossen Forrest, Comment, Loosening the Wrapper on the Sandwich 
Generation: Private Compensation for Family Caregivers, 63 LA. L. REV. 381, 383 (2003) 
(reporting that more than eighty percent of care is provided by family members or 
unpaid volunteer caregivers). 
 177 Lawrence Ganong, Marilyn Coleman, Annette Kusgen McDaniel & Tim 
Killian, Attitudes Regarding Obligations to Assist an Older Parent or Stepparent Following 
Later-Life Remarriage, 60 J. OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAM. 595, 595 (1998). 
 178 Id. at 605; see also ROSSI & ROSSI, supra note 146, at 173, Table 4.7. 
 179 Ganong, Coleman, McDaniel & Killian, supra note 177, at 596–97. 
 180 As discussed elsewhere in this Paper, this diminished sense of obligation is al-
ready recognized in intestacy law when a decedent is survived by a child and a spouse 
who is not the parent of the child.  Laws in many states reduce the award given to a 
spouse if the decedent’s child is not also the child of the surviving spouse.  See, e.g., 
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102(2), (3), & (4) (1990).  Similarly, most states exclude 
stepchildren from any rights of intestate inheritance.  For critique of these laws, see 
Margaret M. Mahoney, Symposium: The Changing Role of the Family in the Law: Stepfami-
lies in the Law of Intestate Succession and Wills, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 917 (1989); Tho-
mas M. Hanson, Note, Intestate Succession For Stepchildren: California Leads The Way, But 
Has It Gone Far Enough?, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 257 (1995); Kim A. Feigenbaum, Note, The 
Changing Family Structure: Challenging Stepchildren’s Lack of Inheritance Rights, 66 BROOK. 
L. REV. 167 (2000). 
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fected by a belief that a stepparent will block the conduit of inheri-
tance that begins with his own parents and ends with his siblings. 
Thus, there are a host of good reasons why individuals may pre-
fer to leave all of their estate to their spouse or all or at least some of 
their estate to their siblings, rather than their parents.  This Paper 
does not attempt to explain definitively the actual rationale motivat-
ing such preferences.  It does, however, suggest several plausible ra-
tionales for the dispositive preferences discussed above, while at the 
same time explaining the strong sense of obligation felt by children 
toward their parents.  Practical reasons based on tax minimization, 
financial planning, and long-term preferential strategies can explain 
current dispositive preferences, without sounding a bellwether for 
the end of the parent/child bond. 
B. Revision Based on the Presumed Will 
Having assessed the existing system and found it wanting, the 
following section makes a number of suggestions for revision and im-
provement of the law based on the empirical evidence regarding the 
presumed will of decedents. 
1. Parents and the Surviving Spouse 
In the situation in which parents and a surviving spouse survive a 
decedent, the current trend in American law of awarding a fraction 
(usually one-half or one-fourth) ought to be discontinued.  It is out of 
line with the presumed will of decedents, which is to award the entire 
intestate estate to the surviving spouse.  As argued above, this does 
not portend an end to society or, even necessarily, a decline in the 
parent/child relationship.  The bond between parents and children 
is still strong, and the sense of obligation that children feel toward 
parents is likewise very strong.  Practical reasons of avoiding taxation 
or leaving the inheritance to those to whom it could be most benefi-
cial could very probably motivate preferences. 
Although the above recommendation serves as a general rule, 
two potential exceptions must be considered.  The first is an excep-
tion based on the economic means of parents.  In other words, al-
though a 100% distribution in favor of the surviving spouse might 
make sense in situations in which one’s parents are financially secure, 
perhaps some award ought to be made to parents in cases in which 
they are in economic need.  Although this argument has some intui-
tive force, it does not appear to be a sufficient reason to detract from 
a surviving spouse’s share.  The empirical evidence described above 
demonstrates that most respondents still favor leaving all to their sur-
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viving spouse, even when the parents are “less financially well off.”181  
This preference is perhaps explained by a similar spousal need or by 
a faith in their siblings’ ability to fulfill their lifetime obligations to-
ward their parents. 
The second situation is posited by Lawrence Waggoner in his 
explanation of the rationale governing the current UPC provision on 
this topic.  Waggoner poses, by way of example, the idea that signifi-
cant assets in a decedent’s estate might be the result of a tort recov-
ery.182  This example is presumably intended to illustrate that an indi-
vidual in a marriage may die possessed of assets that are not the 
product of marital effort and therefore are more appropriately 
awarded to parents in recognition of their support and assistance 
rather than to the surviving spouse.  The same could be said—
perhaps even more forcefully—of property given by parents to their 
children as gifts either prior to or during a child’s marriage. 
This argument, however, is problematic.  First, the desire to have 
deceased children return money or property to their parents in ex-
change or in reciprocation for raising and educating children, rather 
than to have the love and affection throughout one’s life as repay-
ment, is curious to say the least.  Certainly, a parent does not perform 
his obligation to his children out of a sense or even expectation of 
repayment.  The rationale behind this argument, then, must proceed 
from a sense of moral duty or social obligation, which has previously 
been rejected in this context.  Moreover, the idea of tracing the ori-
gin of assets as a basis for award is reminiscent of the old repudiated 
ancestral property statutes, which were largely jettisoned because of 
over-complexity and lack of accord with a decedent’s preferences.183  
This system has long since been abandoned, and its remnants, or at 
least its ideology, ought to be abandoned here too. 
2. Parents and Siblings 
Furthermore, in situations in which both parents and siblings 
survive a decedent, the presumed preferences suggest awarding some 
share of the estate to the siblings in conjunction with the parents. 
Discovering the exact percentage is not an easy task.  First, recall that 
 181 Contemporary Studies Project, supra note 64, at 1140 (reporting fifty-four per-
cent of respondents allocated their entire estate to their surviving spouse even when 
survived by parents who were less well off financially). 
 182 Waggoner, supra note 59, at 231 n.32. 
 183 Only a very small minority of states still maintain ancestral property statutes or 
an equivalent thereof.   See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 897 (2000); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 391.020 (West 2003); NEV. REV. STAT. § 134.070 to 080 (2003). 
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a majority of respondents advocate leaving something to their sib-
lings, whether it be shares equal to those of parents or merely a per 
capita division of the half of the estate not devolving to the parents.  
The exact percentages indicate that 29.2% of the respondents favor 
awarding all of the estate to a surviving parent, 36.4% want to split it 
equally between parents and siblings, 15.4% favor half to the father 
and one-fourth to each sibling, and 7.6% want to split the estate 
equally between the siblings to the exclusion of the father.184
Here, no majoritarian preference exists.  Majoritarian prefer-
ences are important in setting default rules (here, the rules of intes-
tacy) because they serve to eliminate transaction costs for the majority 
of society.185  Gone are the days of Roman times when wills served as 
devices for expression of beliefs and emotions.186  Current evidence 
indicates that testators make wills to alter or depart from intestate dis-
tribution schemes.187  By discovering the intestate preference of the 
majority and establishing a clear distribution to track that preference, 
most of society is saved the expense of making a will.  For obvious 
reasons, then, the absence of a majoritarian preference is problem-
atic.  Tracking a mere plurality preference, rather than a majoritarian 
one, may in some instances result in adopting a rule that provides 
transaction-cost savings only to that mere plurality and requires a ma-
jority to avoid the system of intestacy by making a will to realize their 
preferences. 
Consequently, while further empirical evidence is necessary to 
ascertain the exact fractions that would most accurately reflect the 
presumed will or intent of decedents, a basic majoritarian preference 
does exist.  That is, in this situation involving both surviving parents 
and siblings, less than thirty percent of respondents favored totally 
excluding siblings.188  Reform in modern American intestacy law 
should be considered to reflect this basic majoritarian preference. 
Once again, an exception must be considered.  When a dece-
dent’s sibling is a minor, a direct award to the sibling could be prob-
 184 Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 1, at 346 (reporting that 11.6% of respon-
dents favored some alternative disposition scheme). 
 185 See Hirsch, supra note 3, at 1039. 
 186 EDWARD CHAMPLIN, FINAL JUDGMENTS: DUTY AND EMOTION IN ROMAN WILLS, 200 
B.C.–A.D. 250 8–11 (1991) (stating Roman wills served many purposes including 
“most obviously, express[ing] emotions”). 
 187 See SUSSMAN, CATES & SMITH, supra note 1, at 125 (“[M]ajor redistributions oc-
curred in over 50 percent of the cases.”); Browder, supra note 64, at 1312 (“The data 
. . . shows that most wills do depart to some degree from . . . patterns [of intes-
tacy].”). 
 188 Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 1, at 346. 
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lematic.  A direct award to a minor sibling may involve the costs of 
appointment of a guardian to administer to his interests. To avoid 
these unnecessary administrative costs, the minor sibling’s share 
could be awarded to his parent (i.e., the parent of decedent), which 
would serve as an indirect award to the sibling and at the same time 
avoid the administrative costs. 
A similar situation exists in the intestacy scheme with respect to 
children and a surviving spouse.  In situations in which both exist, 
many states award the entire estate to the surviving spouse, in part as 
an indirect award to the child which avoids unnecessary administra-
tive costs.  In situations in which the surviving spouse is a step-parent 
of the deceased’s child, however, the duty of support for the child 
and the filial bond is not as strong.  Consequently, an award is made 
directly to the child, and the administrative costs are seen as neces-
sary to protect his interest. 
Lessons from the surviving spouse context may also be applied in 
this area.  In cases in which a decedent is survived by a parent and a 
minor sibling, an inheritance award should be made to the parent on 
behalf of the sibling if the surviving parent is also the parent of the 
surviving sibling.  There the familial bonds and obligations exist be-
tween the survivors, which should be sufficient to protect the interests 
of the minor sibling.  On the other hand, in situations in which a 
parent and minor half sibling189 survive a decedent, an award should 
not be made to the parent on behalf of the half sibling, if the surviv-
ing parent is not also the parent of the half sibling.  For example, 
situations frequently occur in which two children are the products of 
different marriages and therefore share only one parent.  In the case 
in which the surviving parent is the common parent between the two 
half siblings, again the duties and bonds between parent and child 
should serve as sufficient protection of the minor sibling’s interest 
and therefore allow an award to the parent on behalf of the child.  
On the other hand, in situations in which the non-common parent 
survives, the duties and obligations existing between the decedent’s 
parent and his or her minor stepchild (i.e., the decedent’s half sib-
ling) are ordinarily not of sufficient strength to merit an award to the 
step-parent on behalf of his or her stepchild.  The inheritance should 
be awarded directly to the minor sibling and the administrative costs 
 189 Most states treat siblings and half siblings the same.  See Ralph C. Brashier, Con-
sanguinity, Sibling Relationships, and the Default Rules of Inheritance Law: Reshaping Half-
Blood Statutes to Reflect the Evolving Family, 58 SMU L. REV. 137, 186–92 (2005) (persua-
sively arguing for a new system under which probate courts have discretion to deter-
mine the intestate share of half-blood relations). 
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of guardianship should be seen as necessary to protect the minor 
child’s interest. 
Thus, in instances in which a decedent is survived by parents and 
siblings, siblings, as a general rule, ought to be allowed to share with 
parents in intestacy.  The exact distribution to each of the heirs is an 
issue beyond the scope of this Paper, but it is hoped that further em-
pirical work will provide an appropriate recommendation.  When a 
sibling of a decedent is a minor, however, practical reasons suggest 
that he ought not receive a direct distribution from his deceased sib-
ling’s estate.  Rather, the award should be made to the common par-
ent that the decedent and minor sibling shared.  In the absence of 
such a common parent, a direct award, even to a minor sibling, is ap-
propriate. 
3. Bad Parents 
Finally, the category of “bad parents,” with slight modification, 
can easily be rescued under the presumed will theory.  As has been 
indicated, “[r]arely would distribution to an unresponsive father ap-
proximate the intent of an illegitimate child.”190  Thus, in most cases, 
this rule can remain, but merely be revised to “unintended” heirs 
rather than “unworthy” heirs.191  The term “unworthiness” is a con-
cept of normative significance that corresponds well with a duty the-
ory of inheritance.  The term “unintended,” on the other hand, is a 
descriptive term that more accords with the presumed will theory of 
intestacy. 
At a minimum, though, alterations need to be made.  First, rec-
onciliation needs to be incorporated as a way a parent can rebut the 
presumption that his “bad” acts have made him an “unintended” 
heir.  For example, suppose a parent, after having abandoned a child, 
reconciles with him and resumes his parental duties prior to the 
child’s death.  Although neither the Restatement nor the UPC pro-
vides an exception for the above situation,192 a few states do allow par-
ents who have abandoned their children to inherit from them if “the 
 190 Kossow, supra note 119, at 85. 
 191 Hirsch, supra note 3, at 1086 (“In a word, default rule theory demands that we 
jettison the very concept of the unworthy heir and replace it with the unintended 
heir.”). 
 192 In fact, both the Restatement and the UPC appear to have overreached in ad-
dressing past situations in which parental conduct or misconduct was irrelevant for 
intestate inheritance purposes. 
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parental relationship and duties are subsequently resumed and con-
tinue until the death of the child.”193
A recent case demonstrates this idea.  In McKinney v. Richitelli, 
the North Carolina Supreme Court addressed the issue of parental 
rights in the context of a father’s claim to his deceased son’s estate.194  
The main asset of the estate was a wrongful death claim against a ra-
diologist alleged to have caused the child’s terminal illness of can-
cer.195  After having concluded that the father “abandoned” his son by 
failing to make child support payments and failing to communicate 
with his son during a fifteen year period, the court considered 
whether, under the statute, the father should still be allowed to in-
herit from his son by virtue of having “resumed . . . care and mainte-
nance at least one year prior to the death of the child and continued 
the same until its death.”196  In concluding that the decedent’s father 
did not fit within the resumption of parental duties exception, the 
court noted that the statute requires not merely the reestablishment 
of a relationship with the child, but a resumption of care and mainte-
nance of the child.197  Because contact with the child was not estab-
lished by the father until the child was almost twenty years old, the 
court concluded that a father could not “resume the maintenance of 
the [child] because his legal obligation to do so ceased at eight-
een.”198  The court found the applicability of the North Carolina ex-
ception to parental disinheritance to apply only when a parent re-
news “both the care and the maintenance of the child during the 
child’s minority, when care and maintenance are most valuable.”199
Although the McKinney case is instructive, the court’s interpreta-
tion goes too far.  If the goal in intestacy is to track the presumed will 
of the deceased, then the court’s reading is too narrow.  For situa-
tions involving minor children, ascertaining their presumed will may 
be difficult, and imposition of the “care and maintenance” standard 
 193 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.4 (McKinney 1998).  To qualify under 
this provision, the resumption of parental duties must be a real one intended to rec-
reate the parent/child relationship.  See, e.g., In re Lascelles’ Estate, 68 N.Y.S.2d 70 
(N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1947); In re Herbster’s Estate, 121 N.Y.S.2d 360 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1947); see 
also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-2(1) (2001). 
 194 586 S.E.2d 258 (N.C. 2003). 
 195 Id. at 260–61. 
 196 Id. at 261 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-2(1) (2001)). 
 197 Id. at 264. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id.; see also Estate of Lunsford, 610 S.E.2d 366, 371 (N.C. 2005) (concluding 
that duties of “care and maintenance” are “interrelated components of a parent’s 
overall responsibilities to his or her minor children,” and thus a parent cannot in-
herit if he abandoned only the “maintenance” but not the “care” of the child). 
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for resumption of a parental relationship may be a wholly appropri-
ate way to encourage parents to resume their parental obligations.  In 
the context of a child having reached the age of majority, however, 
the standard is too rigorous.  If, despite abandonment during child-
hood, a parent resumes a familial relationship with a child who has 
reached the age of majority, such that the adult child has reconciled 
with or forgiven the parent, the apparent grounds for parental disin-
heritance appear to have evaporated. 
The creation of such a resumption-of-parental-duties exception, 
however, will undoubtedly result in increased litigation by otherwise 
unworthy parents raising spurious claims that parental duties have 
been resumed in an attempt to benefit from the estate of a deceased 
child.  The tension between providing a remedy for some and pre-
venting abuse by others is real.  To avoid such vexatious litigation, the 
standard of proof for a parent to establish his resumption of parental 
duties ought to be high. After all, it is the parent who seeks to inherit 
from the child—the very parent who the law deems to be a “bad” 
parent for having shirked his responsibility with respect to the child.  
It would be both counterintuitive and counterproductive to allow a 
claim for reconciliation to be made easily.  By setting the standard 
high, frivolous claimants would be dissuaded, yet most meritorious 
ones should succeed.  Louisiana may serve as an example in this re-
gard.  By virtue of its concept of forced heirship, Louisiana requires a 
fraction of one’s estate to descend to his children, unless just cause 
exists for disinherison.200  If just cause does exist and a child is disin-
herited, he is no longer entitled to his forced share, unless the child 
can demonstrate “reconciliation” with the testator by clear and con-
vincing evidence.201  This standard has served Louisiana well in its 
struggle to avoid frivolous assertions of reconciliation, while at the 
same time allowing for meritorious claims of reconciliation.  The 
same standard is suggested here. 
Secondly, consideration must be given as to whether a child can 
correspondingly inherit in intestacy from the parent who committed 
the bad act.202  That is, if the parent has abandoned and refused to 
acknowledge the child, the parent’s presumed will is likely not to al-
low the child to inherit from him in intestacy either.  Although such 
 200 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1494 (2000). 
 201 Id. art. 1625. 
 202 Hirsch, supra note 3, at 1086 (“When an abandoning parent is the first to die, 
his or her abandoned child can inherit as an intestate heir . . . .  Yet, even more di-
rectly, [one] could infer from the parent’s lifetime decision a preference not to pro-
vide for the child at death either.”). 
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an outcome may offend a societal sense of propriety by allowing a 
“bad parent” to further estrange and abandon an innocent child, 
even after death, this problem is not insuperable.  Adoption of a 
wholesale concept of “forced heirship” would solve the problem.  For 
years, scholars have called for a protection in American law of chil-
dren against disinheritance.203 America stands virtually alone in the 
world by allowing parents to disinherit not only adult children, but 
also minor dependent children.  Even England, America’s intellec-
tual and historical foster parent in the common law, has since 1925 
recognized the importance of protecting minor children from aban-
donment after the death of a parent and allows application to be 
made by a child for “reasonable financial provision.”204
Thus, bad parent statutes that preclude inheritance should be 
retained as they comport with the presumed will of the decedent.  
They should, however, be reformed to include an exception to allow 
for parental inheritance for parents who, despite earlier bad acts, 
have established by clear and convincing evidence that they either re-
sumed the “care and maintenance of a child” during the child’s mi-
nority or reconciled with the child and reestablished their parental 
relationship after the child attained the age of majority.  In addition, 
consideration should also be given to the “bad parent’s” preferences 
at his or her death, however unpalatable those preferences may be.  
Further empirical work may reveal that “bad parents” do not in fact 
want to disinherit their children, but instead feel that they must re-
pent and make up for in death what they neglected in life.  In the 
meantime, however, no such evidence exists, and society must decide 
among adopting a real conception of duty through enactment of a 
family maintenance allowance or a system of forced heirship, or be-
 203 Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Remnant of Forced Heirship: The Interrelationship of Un-
due Influence, What’s Become of Disinherison, and the Unfinished Business of the Stepparent 
Usufruct, 60 LA. L. REV. 637 (2000); Ralph C. Brashier, Protecting the Child From Disin-
heritance: Must Louisiana Stand Alone?, 57 LA. L. REV. 1 (1996); BRASHIER, supra note 
134, at 90–120; Ronald Chester, Should American Children Be Protected Against Disinheri-
tance?, 32 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 405 (1997). 
 204 United Kingdom Inheritance (Provision for the Family and Dependents) Act, 
1975, §2 (Eng.); see also Civil Code of Québec art. 684 (“Every creditor of support 
may within six months after the death claim a financial contribution from the succes-
sion as support.”).  On the danger of these types of discretionary support regimes, 
however, at least in American succession law, see Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and 
Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1185–
94 (1986) (“Our American experience with discretionary distribution on divorce 
should make us extremely wary of any system that would encourage a variety of 
friends and relatives to challenge wills and permit a probate judge to rearrange es-
tate plans.”). 
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ing content to witness the fruits of a scheme of complete unre-
strained donative disposition. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, although parts of our laws on intestacy endorse 
the presumed will theory, a majority of state statutes addressing pa-
rental inheritance do not.  Instead, they endorse the duty theory, or a 
variant thereof, such as the moral duty or expressive theory.  Applica-
tion of these theories is a direct contravention of the presumed will of 
the decedent, a contravention that affects the lower-income, lower-
educated, and underemployed individuals disproportionately more 
than their wealthier, well-educated counterparts.  Returning to a pre-
sumed will theory in the context of parental inheritance need not 
herald a decline in parent/child relations or serve as a concession to 
a society in which the familial ties seem to be spiraling into a bottom-
less abyss. 
The parent/child bond is still strong.  Studies show that a child’s 
sense of familial obligation is near its zenith in the relationship with 
his parents.  Modern laws, though, must adapt to modern societies. 
They cannot stand in a paternalistic role seeking to impose the ful-
fillment of the sense of parental protection and childhood obligation 
that may have prevailed years, decades, or even centuries ago.  
Rather, intestacy law must change to reflect societal preferences and 
desires.  To do otherwise is not only ineffective in communicating the 
intended message, but also serves to endorse a harsh sense of pater-
nalism that fails to accord equal treatment to all those affected by the 
law. 
 
